The dynamic capabilities framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operating in environments of rapid technological change. The competitive advantage of firms is seen as resting on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and combining), shaped by the firm’s (specific) asset positions (such as the firm’s portfolio of difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has adopted or inherited. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing returns exist. Whether and how a firm’s competitive advantage is eroded depends on the stability of market demand, and the ease of replicability (expanding internally) and imitatability (replication by competitors). If correct, the framework suggests that private wealth creation in regimes of rapid technological change depends in large measure on honing internal technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm. In short, identifying new opportunities and organizing effectively and efficiently to embrace them are generally more fundamental to private wealth creation than is strategizing, if by strategizing one means engaging in business conduct that keeps competitors off balance, raises rival’s costs, and excludes new entrants. (C) 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
战略管理杂志。 18:7 ， 509-533 （ 1997 ）
动态能力框架分析方法的来源和财富创造和捕捉由私人企业公司在环境的技术快速变化。竞争优势的公司被视为搁在独特的过程(方法的协调和结合),受到公司的(特定的)资产头寸(如该公司的投资组合的难以贸易知识资产和互补资产),和演化路径(s)已采取或继承。路径依赖的重要性是放大收益递增的情况存在。是否和怎样一个公司的竞争优势是侵蚀取决于市场需求的稳定性,易于复现性(扩大内部)和imitatability(复制竞争对手)。如果正确,框架表明,私人财富创造在政权的技术快速变化很大程度上取决于内部技术、组织、珩磨和管理流程在公司。总之,识别新的机会和组织有效和高效地拥抱他们通常更基本的私人财富创造比谋略,如果通过策划一个意味着从事商业行为,使对手失去平衡,提高竞争对手的成本,不包括新进入者。(C)1997年由约翰?威利父子公司。
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental question in the field of strategic management is how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage. We confront this question here by developing the dynamic capabilities approach, which endeavors to analyze the sources of wealth creation and capture by firms. The development of this framework flows from a recognition by the authors that strategic theory is replete with analyses of firm-level strategies for sustaining and safeguarding extant competitive advantage, but has performed less well with respect to assisting in the understanding of how and why certain firms build competitive advantage in regimes of rapid change. Our approach is especially relevant in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of existing competences. The approach endeavors to explain firm-level success and failure. We are interested in both building a better theory of firm performance, as well as informing managerial practice.
In order to position our analysis in a manner that displays similarities and differences with existing approaches, we begin by briefly reviewing accepted frameworks for strategic management. We endeavor to expose implicit assumptions, and identify competitive circumstances where each paradigm might display some relative advantage as both a useful descriptive and normative theory of competitive strategy. While numerous theories have been advanced over the past two decades about the sources of competitive advantage, many cluster around just a few loosely structured frameworks or paradigms. In this paper we attempt to identify three existing paradigm and describe aspects of an emerging new paradigms that we label dynamic capabilities.
The dominant paradigm in the field during the 1980s was the competitive forces approach developed by Porter (1980). This approach rooted in the structure–conduct–performance paradigm of industrial organization (Mason, 1949 Bain, 1959), emphasizes the actions a firm can take to create defensible positions against competitive forces. A second approach, referred to as a strategic conflict approach (e.g., Shapiro, 19) is closely related to the first in its focus on product market imperfections, entry deterrence and strategic interaction. The strategic conflict approach uses the tools of game theory and thus implicitly views competitive outcomes as a function of the effectiveness with which firms keep their rivals off balance through strategic investments, pricing strategies, signaling, and the control of information. Both the competitive force and the strategic conflict approaches appear to share the view that rents flow from privileged product market positions.
Another distinct class of approaches emphasizes building competitive advantage through capturing entrepreneurial rents stemming from fundamental firm-level efficiency advantages. These approaches have their roots in a much older discussion of corporate strengths and weaknesses they have taken on new life as evidence suggest that firms build enduring advantages only through efficiency and effectiveness, and as development in organizational economics and the study on technological and organizational change become applied to strategy questions. One strand of this literature, often referred to as the ‘resource-based perspective,’ emphasizes firm-specific capabilities and assets and the existence of isolating mechanisms as the fundamental determinants of firm performance (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 19842). This perspective recognizes but does not attempt to explain the nature of the isolating mechanisms that enable entrepreneurial rents and competitive advantage to be sustained.
??简介
在战略管理领域的根本问题是企业如何获得和保持竞争优势。我们面对这个问题，在这里发展动态能力的方法，努力创造财富的来源进行分析，并捕获由企业。这个框架的发展，从战略理论是由作者充满维持和维护现存的竞争优势的企业级战略分析确认，但对于协助了解如何以及为什么某些公司的表现稍逊在快速变化的制度，建立竞争优势。在熊彼特创新为基础的竞争，价格/性能的竞争，报酬递增，现有的能力和“创造性破坏”的世界，我们的做法是特别相关。的方法解释企业层面的成功和失败的努力。我们有兴趣在这两个建筑企业绩效的一种较好的理论，以及通知管理实践。
为了定位我们的分析，我们首先简要回顾公认的框架，战略管理的方式显示与现有方法的异同。我们将尽力揭露隐含的假设，并找出有竞争力的情况下，作为一个有用的描述性和规范性的竞争战略理论，每个范式可能显示一些相对的优势。虽然已经提出了许多理论在过去二十年的竞争优势来源，许多集群周围只是一个结构松散的框架或范式。在本文中，我们试图找出现有三个范式和描述方面的一门新兴的新的范式，我们的标签动态能力。
在20世纪80年代在该领域的主导范式是由波特（ 1980）接近开发的竞争力。这种做法植根于工业组织（梅森，1959年， 1949年贝恩）的结构 - 行为 - 绩效范式，强调企业可以创建守难攻的位置，对竞争力的行动。第二种方法称为一个战略冲突的方法（例如，19年，夏皮罗）是密切相关的第一个专注于产品市场的不完善，进入威慑和战略互动。战略冲突的方法是使用博弈论的工具，从而隐含地认为，有竞争力的结果作为一个功能与企业保持他们的对手失去平衡，通过战略投资，定价策略，信令和控制信息的有效性。竞争力和战略冲突的方法似乎赞同这样的观点租金流产品的市场地位。
?另一个不同的类的方法，强调建立竞争优势，通过捕捉创业租金源于基本的企业级的效率优势。这些方法都有其根源在旧讨论企业的长处和短处，他们已经采取了新的生活的证据表明，企业建立持久的优势，只能通过效率和效益，组织经济学的发展和研究的技术和组织变革成为适用于战略问题。这种文学的一个链，通常被称为“资源为基础的角度，强调企业的具体能力和资产隔离机制的存在，作为企业绩效的根本决定因素（彭罗斯， 1959 ;罗曼尔特的， 19842 ） 。这个角度认识，但并不试图解释性质的隔离机制，使企业家租和竞争优势得以持续。
Another component of the efficiency-based approach is developed in this paper. Rudimentary efforts are made to identify the dimensions of firm-specific capabilities that can be sources of advantage, and to explain how combinations of competences and resources can be developed, deployed, and protected. We refer to this as the ‘dynamic capabilities’ approach in order to stress exploiting existing internal and external firm specific competences to address changing environments. Elements of the approach can be found in Schumpeter (1942), Penrose (1959), Nelson and Winter (1982), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Teece (1976, 1986a, 1986b, 1988) and in Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark (1988): Because this approach emphasizes the development of management capabilities, and difficult-to-imitate combinations of organizational, functional and technological skills, it integrates and draws upon research in such areas as the management of R&D, product and process development, technology transfer, intellectual property, manufacturing, human resources, and organizational learning. Because these fields are often viewed as outside the traditional boundaries of strategy, much of this research has not been incorporated into existing economic approaches to strategy issues. As a result, dynamic capabilities can be seen as an emerging and potentially integrative approach to understanding the newer sources of competitive advantage.
We suggest that the dynamic capabilities approach is promising both in terms of future research potential and as an aid to management endeavoring to gain competitive advantage in increasingly demanding environments. To illustrate the essential elements of the dynamic capabilities approach, the sections that follow compare and contrast this approach to other models of strategy. Each section highlights the strategic insights provided by each approach as well as the different competitive circumstances in which it might be most appropriate. Needless to say, these approaches are in many ways complementary and a full understanding of firm-level, competitive advantage requires an appreciation of all four approaches and more.
本文开发的效率为基础的方法的另一个组成部分。简陋的努力都是为了确定企业特定的能力，可以尺寸的优势来源，并解释如何组合的能力和资源可以开发，部署和保护。我们称此为“动态能力”的做法，为了强调利用现有的内部和外部公司的具体能力，以应对不断变化的环境。元素的方法，可以发现在熊彼特（1942），彭罗斯（1959），纳尔逊和温特（1982），普拉哈拉德和哈默尔（1990），蒂斯（1976，1986A，1986b，1988）和海耶斯，车匠，和克拉克（1988）：因为这种做法强调了管理能力的发展，并难以-到-模仿的组织功能和技术技能的组合，它整合并绘制后，在研发管理，产品和工艺开发，技术等
领域的研究转让，知识产权，制造，人力资源，组织学习。因为这些领域往往被视为传统的战略边界外，本研究还没有被纳入到现有的经济战略问题的方法。因此，动态能力，可以被看作是一个新兴市场和潜在的综合性的方法来理解新的竞争优势来源。
我们认为，动态能力的方法是看好双方未来的研究潜力和管理，努力在日益苛刻的环境中获得竞争优势的援助。为了说明动态能力方法的基本要素，下面的章节中比较和对比其他车型战略方针。每节突出了每种方法，以及不同的竞争环境下，它可能是最合适的战略洞察力。不用说，这些方法在许多方面互补性和充分的了解企业层面，竞争优势，需要所有四个方法和更多的升值。
MODELS OF STRATEGY EMPHASIZING THE EXPLOITATION OF MARKET POWER Competitive forces
The dominant paradigm in strategy at least during the 1980s was the competitive forces approach. Pioneered by Porter (1980), the competitive forces approach views the essence of competitive strategy formulation as ‘relating a company to its environment ... [T]he key aspect of the firm’s environment is the industry or industries in which it competes.’ Industry structure strongly influences the competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies potentially available to firms.
In the competitive forces model, five industry-level forces—entry barriers, threat of substitution, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry among industry incumbents—determine the inherent profit potential of an industry or sub-segment of an industry. The approach can be used to help the firm find a position in an industry from which it can best defend itself against competitive forces or influence them in its favor (Porter, 1980: 4).
This ‘five-forces’ framework provides a systematic way of thinking about how competitive forces work at the industry level and how these forces determine the profitability of different industries and industry segments. The competitive forces framework also contains a number of underlying assumptions about the sources of competition and the nature of the strategy process. To facilitate comparisons with other approaches, we highlight several distinctive characteristics of the framework.
Economic rents in the competitive forces framework are monopoly rents (Teece, 1984). Firms in an industry earn rents when they are somehow able to impede the competitive forces (in either factor markets or product markets) which tend to drive economic returns to zero. Available strategies are described in Porter (1980). Competitive strategies are often aimed at altering the firm’s position in the industry vis-a-vis competitors and suppliers. Industry structure plays a central role in determining and limiting strategic action.
Some industries or subsectors of industries become more ‘attractive’ because they have structural impediments to competitive forces (e,g: entry barriers) that allow firms better opportunities for creating sustainable competitive advantages. Rents are created largely at the industry or subsector level rather than at the firm level. While there is some recognition given to firm-specific assets, differences among firms relate primarily to scale. This approach to strategy reflects its incubation inside the field of industrial organization and in particular the industrial structure school of Mason and Bain(Teece, 1984).
模型开发的战略强调市场力量
竞争力
在战略上，至少在上世纪80年代的主导范式是竞争力的方法。波特（1980） ，首创竞争力的方法看待一家公司有关其环境制定竞争战略的精髓...... [T]他公司的环境的关键环节是它竞争的行业或产业。产业结构强烈地影响着竞争的游戏规则，以及可能提供给企业的战略。
在竞争力模型，五个行业级进入壁垒，替代威胁，买方议价能力，供应商的议价能力，行业之间的竞争现任确定一个行业或一个行业的细分市场固有的潜在利润。该方法可以用来帮助公司在一个行业中找到一个位置，它最能扞卫本身对竞争力影响他们对其有利（波特，1980：4）。
这“五力”框架提供了一个系统的竞争力如何，在行业层面的工作，这些力量如何确定不同行业和细分行业的盈利能力的思考方式。竞争力框架还包含了一些竞争的来源和性质的战略过程中的基本假设。为了便于与其他方法比较，我们强调几个特色鲜明的框架。
竞争力框架中的经济租金的垄断租金（蒂斯，1984）。在一个行业的企业赚取租金时，他们已经在某种程度上能够阻碍竞争力（无论是要素市场或产品市场）倾向于推动经济回报为零。波特（1980年）中描述可用的策略。竞争策略往往是为了改变公司的面对面的人在行业竞争对手和供应商的地位。工业结构中起着核心的作用，在确定和战略行动。
一些行业或子行业变得更加“有吸引力”，因为他们有竞争力（E，G：准入门槛），建立可持续的竞争优势，使企业更好的发展机会的结构性障碍。租金主要是在行业或界别分组的水平，而不是在企业层面建立。虽然有一些公司特定资产的识别，企业之间的差异主要涉及规模。这种策略的方法来反映其孵化产业组织领域内，特别是产业结构学校梅森和贝恩（蒂斯，1984）。
Strategic conflict
The publication of Carl Shapiro’s 19 article, confidently titled ‘The Theory of Business Strategy,’ announced the emergence of a new approach to business strategy, if not strategic management. This approach utilizes the tools of game theory to analyze the nature of competitive interaction between rival firms. The main thrust of work in this tradition is to reveal how a firm can influence the behavior and actions of rival firms and thus the market environment. Examples of such moves are investment in capacity (Dixit, 1980), R&D (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982), and advertising (Schmalensee,1983). To be effective, these strategic moves require irreversible commitments. The moves in question will have no effect if they can be costlessly undone. A key idea is that by manipulating the market environment, a firm may be able to increase its profits.
This literature, together with the contestability literature (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982), has led to a greater appreciation of the role of sunk costs, as opposed to fixed costs, in determining competitive outcomes. Strategic moves can also be designed to influence rivals’ behavior through signaling. Strategic signaling has been examined in a number of contexts, including predatory pricing (Kreps and Wilson, 1982a, 1982b) and limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a, 1982b). More recent treatments have emphasized the role of commitment and reputation (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991) and the benefits of firms simultaneously pursuing competition and cooperation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995, 1996).
战略冲突
公布19年卡尔·夏皮罗的文章，自信题为“企业战略理论，”宣布的经营策略出现了一种新的方法，如果没有战略管理。这种方法利用博弈论分析工具的性质，有竞争力的对手公司之间的互动。在这一传统中工作的主旨在于揭示企业如何影响对手企业的行为和动作，因而市场环境。这些举措的例子是投资的能力（迪克西特1980） ， R＆ D（吉尔伯特和纽贝里，1982年） ，广告（施马兰西，1983） 。是有效的，这些战略举措，需要不可逆转的承诺。移动不会有任何影响，如果他们可以无成本地撤消。一个关键的想法是，通过操纵的市场环境，公司或许能够增加其利润。
这种文学与的可争议文学（ 1982）鲍莫尔，帕恩查和威利格，导致更大的升值沉没成本，而不是固定的成本，决定竞争结果的作用。战略举措，也可以通过信令来影响对手的行为。战略信号已检查在一些情况下，包括掠夺性定价（克瑞普斯和威尔逊，1982年， 1982b ） ，定价（米尔格罗姆和罗伯茨， 1982a ， 1982b ） 。最近的治疗强调承诺和信誉的作用（例如，格玛沃特，1991） ，同时追求竞争的合作（勃兰登堡和纳尔巴夫的， 1995年， 1996年）的企业的好处。
In many instances, game theory formalizes long-standing intuitive arguments about various types of business behavior (e.g., predatory pricing, patent races), though in some instances it has induced a substantial change in the conventional wisdom. But by rationalizing observed behavior by reference to suitably designed games, in explaining everything these models also explain nothing, as they do not generate testable predictions (Sutton, 1992). Many specific game-theoretic models admit multiple equilibrium, and a wide range of choice
exists as to the design of the appropriate game form to be used. Unfortunately, the results often depend on the precise specification chosen. The equilibrium in models of strategic behavior crucially depends on what one rival believes another rival will do in a particular situation. Thus the qualitative features of the results may depend on the way price competition is modeled (e.g., Bertrand or Cournot) or on the presence or absence of strategic asymmetries such as first-mover advantages. The analysis of strategic moves using game theory can be thought of as ‘dynamic’ in the sense that multiperiod analyses can be pursued both intuitively and formally. However, we use the term ‘dynamic’ in this paper in a different sense, referring to situations where there is rapid change in technology and market forces, and‘feedback’ effects on firms. 博弈论在许多情况下，正式长期直观的各种类型的商业行为（如掠夺性定价，专利竞赛）的争论，虽然在某些情况下，它引发了实质性的变化，在传统的智慧。但通过观察到的行为合理化的参考设计合适的游戏，解释一切，这些模型也可以解释什么，因为他们不产生可检验的预测（萨顿，1992年） 。许多具体的博弈论模型的多个平衡承认，存在广泛的选择，要使用的适当的游戏的形式设计。不幸的是，其结果通常依赖于所选择的精确规格。战略行为模型的平衡，关键取决于一个对手，相信另一个对手将在特定情况下做什么。因此，定性特征的结果可能依赖于价格竞争方式是仿照（如伯特兰或古诺） ，或如先发优势的战略不对称的存在或不存在。运用博弈论分析的战略举措，可以被认为是在这个意义上，可以追求多期分析直观正式为“动态” 。然而，我们在本文在不同的意义上使用的术语“动态”，指的是快速变化的技术和市场的力量，和“反馈”对企业的影响情况。
We have a particular view of the contexts in which the strategic conflict literature is relevant to strategic management. Firms that have a tremendous cost or other competitive advantage vis-a-vis their rivals ought not be transfixed by the moves and countermoves of their rivals. Their competitive fortunes will swing more on total demand conditions, not on how competitors deploy and redeploy their competitive assets. Put differently, when there are gross asymmetries in competitive advantage between firms, the results of game-theoretic analysis are likely to be obvious and uninteresting. The stronger competitor will generally advance, even if disadvantaged by certain information asymmetries. To be sure, incumbent firms can be undone by new entrants with a dramatic cost advantage, but no ‘gaming’ will overturn that outcome. On the other hand, if firms’ competitive positions are more delicately balanced, as with Coke and Pepsi, and United Airlines and American Airlines, then strategic conflict is of interest to competitive outcomes. Needless to say, there are many such circumstances, but they are rare in industries where there is rapid technological change and fast-shifting market circumstances.
我们有上下文的战略冲突文学是有关战略管理的特定视图。企业有一个巨大的成本或其他竞争优势，他们的对手面对面的人不应该被他们的对手的招式和对策研究呆若木鸡。他们的竞争命运摆幅会总需求的情况下，而不是竞争对手如何部署和重新部署自己的竞争资产。换句话说，当有竞争力的优势企业之间的严重不对称，博弈论分析的结果可能是明显的和无趣的。更强的竞争者通常会提前，即使通过一定的信息不对称的弱势。可以肯定的是，现任公司可以撤消一个戏剧性的成本优势的新进入者，但没有'游戏'将推翻这一结果。另一方面，如果企业的竞争地位更微妙的平衡，与可口可乐和百事可乐，美国联合航空公司和美国航空公司，战略冲突是利益竞争的结果。不用说，有很多这样的情况，但他们在工业部门，那里是快速的技术变革和快速变化的市场情况是罕见的。
In short, where competitors do not have deep-seated competitive advantages, the moves and countermoves of competitors can often be usefully formulated in game-theoretic terms. However, we doubt that game theory can comprehensively illuminate how Chrysler should compete against Toyota and Honda, or how United Airlines can best respond to Southwest Airlines since Southwest’s advantage is built on organizational attributes which United cannot readily replicate. Indeed, the entrepreneurial side of strategy—how significant new rent streams are created and protected—is largely ignored by the game- theoretic approach. Accordingly, we find that the approach, while important, is most relevant when competitors are closely matched and the
population of relevant competitors and the identity of their strategic alternatives can be readily ascertained. Nevertheless, coupled with other approaches it can sometimes yield powerful insights.
However, this research has an orientation that we are concerned about in terms of the implicit framing of strategic issues. Rents, from a game-theoretic perspective, are ultimately a result of managers’ intellectual ability to ‘play the game.’ The adage of the strategist steeped in this approach is ‘do unto others before they do unto you.’ We worry that fascination with strategic moves and Machiavellian tricks will distract managers from seeking to build more enduring sources of competitive advantage. The approach unfortunately ignores competition as a process involving the development, accumulation, combination, and protection of unique skills and capabilities. Since strategic interactions are what receive focal attention, the impression one might receive from this literature is that success in the marketplace is the result of sophisticated plays and counter-plays, when this is generally not the case at all.
In what follows, we suggest that building a dynamic view of the business enterprise—something missing from the two approaches we have so far identified—enhances the probability of establishing an acceptable descriptive theory of strategy that can assist practitioners in the building of long-run advantage and competitive flexibility. Below, we discuss first the resource-based perspective and then an extension we call the dynamic capabilities approach.
总之，竞争对手不具有深层次的竞争优势，竞争对手的动向及对策博弈理论的角度来看，往往可以有效地制定。然而，我们怀疑，博弈论可以全面照亮克莱斯勒应该如何抗衡丰田和本田，美国联合航空公司如何能最好地响应以来西南航空公司西南航空公司的优势是建立在组织联合国不能轻易复制的属性。事实上，创业方面的策略如何显着的新的租金流的创建和保护很大程度上忽视了博弈论的方法。因此，我们发现，而重要的是，该方法是最相关的，当竞争对手正在密切配合，有关竞争对手和人口的身份，他们的战略选择，可以很容易地确定。尽管如此，再加上其他的方法，它有时可以产生强大的见解。
然而，这项研究有一个方向，我们所关心的战略问题的隐式取景。租金，从博弈论的角度来看，管理者的智力能力玩游戏的最终结果。“沉浸在这种方法的战略家的格言是”做给别人之前，他们做你们。 “我们担心迷恋会分散管理者的战略举措和权谋技巧，寻求建立更持久的竞争优势的来源。不幸的是，这种方法忽略了作为一个独特的技能和能力的发展，积累，组合，和保护的过程，涉及的竞争。由于战略的相互作用是收到焦点关注，可能会收到从这个文学的印象是，在市场上是成功的结果，复杂的戏剧和反了时，这通常不是在所有的情况。
在下文中，我们建议建立的动态视图企业若有所失两种方法，我们至今所得的提高建立一个可接受的描述性理论的策略，可以帮助从业者在长远建设的概率优势和竞争力的灵活性。下面，我们讨论第一个资源型的角度，然后扩展我们称之为动态能力的方法。
MODELS OF STRATEGY EMPHASIZING EFFICIENCY Resource-based perspective
The resource-based approach sees firms with superior systems and structures being profitable not because they engage in strategic investment that may deter entry and raise prices above long-run costs, but because they have markedly lower costs, or offer markedly higher quality or product performance. This approach focuses on the rents accruing to the owners of scarce firm-specific resources rather than the economic profits from product market positioning. Competitive advantage lies ‘upstream’ of product markets and rests on the firm’s idiosyncratic and difficult-to-imitate resources.
One can find the resources approach suggested by the earlier preanalytic strategy literature. A leading text of the 1960s (Learned et al., 1969) noted that ‘the capability of an organization is its demonstrated and potential ability to accomplish against the opposition of circumstance or competition, whatever it sets out to do. Every organization has actual and potential strengths and weaknesses; it is important to try to determine what they are and to distinguish one from the other. Thus what a firm can do is not just a function of the opportunities it
confronts; it also depends on what resources the organization can muster.
战略强调效率模型
基于资源的视角
基于资源的方法看到企业盈利并不是因为他们从事战略投资，可能慑入，提高长期运行的成本价格要高于具有超强的系统和结构，但因为他们有显着降低成本，或提供显着更高的质量或产品性能。这种方法侧重于企业特有的稀缺资源，而不是从产品市场定位的经济利润的业主获得的租金。竞争优势在于产品市场的“上游”，依赖于公司的特质和难以模仿的资源。
人们可以发现早期的分析前的战略文献资源的建议的方法。 20世纪60年代的一家领先的文本（学习等，1969）指出：“一个组织的能力是其表现出的能力和潜在能力，来完成对反对派的情况或竞争，不管它做。每个组织都有实际的和潜在的长处和短处，它是重要的尝试，以确定它们是什么以及从其他区分。因此，企业可以做的不只是一个功能，它面临的机会，它也依赖于资源的组织可以鼓起。
Learned et al, proposed that the real key to a company’s success or even to its future development lies in its ability to find or create ‘a competence that is truly distinctive.’ This literature also recognized the constraints on firm behavior and, in particular, noted that one should not assume that management ‘can rise to any occasion.’ These insights do appear to keenly anticipate the resource-based approach that has since emerged, but they did not provide a theory or systematic framework for analyzing business strategies. Indeed, Andrews (1987: 46) noted that ‘much of what is intuitive in this process is yet to be identified.’ Unfortunately, the academic literature on capabilities stalled for a couple of decades.
New impetus has been given to the resource-based approach by recent theoretical developments in organizational economics and in the theory of strategy, as well as by a growing body of anecdotal and empirical literature that highlights the importance of firm-specific factors in explaining firm performance. Cool and Schendel (1988) have shown that there are systematic and significant performance differences among firms which belong to the same strategic group within the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Rumelt (1991) has shown that intraindustry differences in profits are greater than interindustry differences in profits, strongly suggesting the importance of firm-specific factors and the relative unimportance Jacobsen (1988) and Hansen of industry effects. and Wernerfelt (19) made similar findings.
教训等。提出，一个公司的成功或者甚至其未来的发展真正的关键在于它来找到或创建“一个能力，是真正独特的能力。 ”这些文献也承认对企业行为的约束和，特别是，指出一个人应该不要以为管理上升到任何场合。这些见解会出现以来出现的资源为基础的方法，敏锐地预测，但他们没有提供一个理论或系统架构分析业务策略。事实上，安德鲁斯（ 1987： 46 ）指出：“在这个过程中有什么直观的多是尚未确定。”不幸的是，学术文献的能力几十年停滞不前。
?近期组织经济学的理论发展和战略的理论，新动力已经给资源为基础的方法，以及越来越多的传闻和实证文献的重要性，突出企业特定的因素在解释公司业绩。 （ Cool及施申德的， 1988）表明，有系统和企业之间的差异显着的性能在美国制药行业属于同样的战略。罗曼尔特（1991 ）显示，在利润的产业内差异大于利润的行业间差异，强烈建议公司特定的因素和行业的影响相对次要雅各布森（ 1988）和汉森的重要性。晋宽（19）提出了类似的结果。
A comparison of the resource-based approach and the competitive forces approach (discussed earlier in the paper) in terms of their implications for the strategy process is revealing. From the first perspective, an entry decision looks roughly as follows: (1)pick an industry (based on its ‘structural attractiveness’); (2)choose an entry strategy based on conjectures about competitors’ rational strategies; (3)if not already possessed, acquire or otherwise obtain the requisite assets to compete in the market. From this perspective, the process of identifying and developing the requisite assets is not particularly problematic. The process involves nothing more than choosing rationally among a well-defined set of investment alternatives. If assets are not already owned, they
can be bought. The resource-based perspective is strongly at odds with this conceptualization.
From the resource-based perspective, firms are heterogeneous with respect to their resources/ capabilities/endowments. Further, resource endowments are ‘sticky:’ at least in the short run, firms are to some degree stuck with what they have This and may have to live with what they lack. stickiness arises for three reasons. First, business development is viewed as an extremely complex process. Quite simply, firms lack the organizational capacity to develop new competences quickly (Dierickx and Cool, 19). Secondly, some assets are simply not readily tradeable, for example, tacit know-how (Teece, 1976, 1980) and reputation (Dierickx and Cool, 19). Thus, resource endowments cannot equilibrate through factor input markets. Finally, even when an asset can be purchased, firms may stand to gain little by doing so. As Barney (1986) points out, unless a firm is lucky, possesses superior information, or both, the price it pays in a competitive factor market will fully capitalize the rents from the asset.
资源为基础的方法和战略进程及其影响方面的竞争力的方法（前面讨论的文件）的比较揭示。从第一个角度看，进入决策看起来大致如下：（1）选择一个行业（基于其结构吸引力），（2）基于猜测竞争对手的理性策略选择的进入策略;（3）如果不已经具备，收购或以其他方式取得所需的资产，在市场竞争中。从这个角度来看，必要的资产识别和开发的过程中是不是特别有问题的。这一过程涉及无非理性之间选择一个明确的投资选择。如果尚未拥有资产，他们可以购买。基于资源的观点是强烈这种概念化的赔率。
从资源的角度来看，企业是异质性对于他们的资源/能力/禀赋。此外，资源禀赋是“粘性：”至少在短期来看，公司在一定程度上与他们有什么，可能要住他们缺乏什么卡住。粘性产生的原因有三个。首先，业务发展被看作是一个极其复杂的过程。很简单，企业缺乏组织能力，以快速开发新的能力（迪耶里克酷，19）。其次，部分资产根本不容易流通，例如，默契诀窍（蒂斯，1976年，1980年）和的声誉（迪耶里克和冷，19年）。因此，资源禀赋不能平衡通过要素投入市场。最后，即便可以购买资产，公司可能进账很少这样做。由于巴尼（1986）指出，除非公司是幸运的，具有优越的信息，或两者兼而有之，它支付的价格有竞争力的因素市场将充分利用资产的租金。
Given that in the resources perspective firms possess heterogeneous and sticky resource bundles, the entry decision process suggested by this approach is as follows: (1) identify your firm’s unique resources; (2)decide in which markets those resources can earn the highest rents; and (3)decide whether the rents from those assets are most effectively utilized by (a)integrating into related market(s), (b)selling the relevant intermediate output to related firms, or (c)selling the assets themselves to a firm in related businesses (Teece, 1980, 1982).
The resource-based perspective puts both vertical integration and diversification into a new strategic light. Both can be viewed as ways of capturing rents on scarce, firm-specific assets whose services are difficult to sell in intermediate markets (Penrose, 1959; Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1980, 1982, 1986a, 1986b; Wernerfelt, 1984). Empirical work on the relationship between performance and diversification by Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) provides evidence for this proposition. It is evident that the resource-based perspective focuses on strategies for exploiting existing firm-specific assets.
However, the resource-based perspective also invites consideration of managerial strategies for developing new capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984). Indeed, if control over scarce resources is the source of economic profits, then it follows that such issues as skill acquisition, the management of knowledge and know-how (Shuen, 1994), and learning become fundamental strategic issues. It is in this second dimension, encompassing skill acquisition, learning, and accumulation of organizational and intangible or ‘invisible’ assets (Itami and Roehl, 1987), that we believe lies the greatest potential for contributions to strategy.
鉴于在资源角度来看公司拥有异构和粘性资源包,入口决策过程提出这种方法如下:(1)确定贵公司的独特资源;(2)决定在哪个市场这些资源可以赚取最高的租金;(3)决定是否从这些资产的租金是最
有效地利用(a)融入相关市场(s),(b)销售相关的中间输出相关的公司,或(c)出售这些资产本身到公司相关业务(蒂斯,1980,1982)。
资源视角使它们垂直一体化和多元化进入新的战略光。两者都可以被视为租金的方式获取稀缺,公司特有的资产的服务很难销售在中间市场(彭罗斯,1959;威廉姆森,1975;蒂斯,1980,1982,1986,1986 b;Wernerfelt,1984)。实证工作绩效和多元化之间的关系由Wernerfelt和蒙哥马利(1988)提供了证据表明这一命题。显然,基于资源视角关注策略利用现有公司特有的资产。
然而,基于资源的视角也邀请考虑的管理策略开发新功能(Wernerfelt,1984)。事实上,如果控制稀缺资源是经济利润的来源,也就是说,技能获取等问题,管理的知识和技能(Shuen,1994),和学习成为基本的战略问题。在这第二个维度,包括技能习得、学习和积累的组织和无形或“无形资产(Itami和Roehl,1987),我们相信谎言最大的潜在贡献的战略。
The dynamic capabilities approach: Overview
动态能力的方法：概述
The global competitive battles in high-technology industries such as semiconductors, information services, and software have demonstrated the need for an expanded paradigm to understand how competitive advantage is achieved. Well-known companies like IBM, Texas Instruments, Philips, and others appear to have followed a ‘resource-based strategy’ of accumulating valuable technology assets, often guarded by an aggressive intellectual property stance. However, this strategy is often not enough to support a significant competitive advantage. Winners in the global marketplace have been firms that can demonstrate timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, coupled with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences. Not surprisingly, industry observers have remarked that companies can accumulate a large stock of valuable technology assets and still not have many useful capabilities.
We refer to this ability to achieve new forms of competitive advantage as ‘dynamic capabilities’ to emphasize two key aspects that were not the main focus of attention in previous strategy perspectives. The term ‘dynamic’ refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environment; certain innovative responses are required when time-to-market and timing are critical, the rate of technological change is rapid, and the nature of future competition and markets difficult to determine. The term ‘capabilities’ emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources, and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing environment.
高科技产业如半导体，信息服务和软件的全球竞争战斗中，已经证明扩大范式来理解如何实现竞争优势的需要。知名的公司，如IBM，德州仪器，飞利浦，和别人似乎已经遵循了“以资源为基础的战略”积累了宝贵的技术资产，往往守卫一个侵略性的知识产权立场。然而，这种策略往往是不足够支持一个显着的竞争优势。在全球市场中的优胜者已经能证明的及时响应，快速和灵活的产品创新，管理能力，有效地协调和调动内部和外部竞争力的公司。这并不奇怪，业内观察家表示，公司积累了大量有价值的技术资产存量，但仍不能有许多有用的功能。
我们参照这个能力，以实现竞争优势的新形式，“动态能力”强调两个关键环节，是不是以前的战略观点的主要焦点关注。术语“动态”是指能力的更新能力，从而实现一致性与不断变化的业务环境，需要一定的创新反应时对市场和时机是关键，技术变化的速度快，与自然未来的竞争和市场难以确定。术语“能力”强调战略管理，适当地调整，整合和重新配置内部和外部的组织技能，资源和功能能力相匹配的要求，一个不断变化的环境中的关键作用。
One aspect of the strategic problem facing an innovating firm in a world of Schumpeterian competition is to identify difficult-to-imitate internal and external competences most likely to support valuable products and services. Thus, as argued by Dierickx and Cool (19), choices about how much to spend (invest) on different
possible areas are central to the firm’s strategy. However, choices about domains of competence are influenced by past choices. At any given point in time, firms must follow a certain trajectory or path of competence development. This path not only defines what choices are open to the firm today, but it also puts bounds around what its internal repertoire is likely to be in the future. Thus, firms, at various points in time, make longterm, quasi-irreversible commitments to certain domains of competence.
The notion that competitive advantage requires both the exploitation of existing internal and external firm-specific capabilities, and developing new ones is partially developed in Penrose (1959), Teece (1982), and Wernerfelt (1984). However, only recently have researchers begun to focus on the specifics of how some organizations first develop firm-specific capabilities and how they renew competences to respond to shifts These issues are in the business environment. intimately tied to the firm’s business processes, market positions, and expansion paths. Several writers have recently offered insights and evidence on how firms can develop their capability to adapt and even capitalize on rapidly changing environments. The dynamic capabilities approach seeks to provide a coherent framework which can both integrate existing conceptual and empirical knowledge, and facilitate prescription. In doing so, it builds upon the theoretical foundations provided by Schumpeter (1934), Penrose (1959), Williamson (1975, 1985), Barney (1986), Nelson and Winter (1982), Teece (1988), and Teece et al. (1994).
熊彼特竞争的世界面临着一个创新公司的战略问题的一个方面是要找出最有可能支持有价值的产品和服务难以模仿的内部和外部竞争力。因此，主张由迪耶里克和冷色（19），大约要花多少钱（投资），根据不同的区域的选择是公司战略的核心。然而，选择主管领域内的影响由过去的选择。在任何给定的时间点，企业必须遵循一定的轨迹或路径的能力发展。这条道路，不仅定义了什么样的选择是公司开放的今天，但它也把其内部的剧目围绕什么是可能在未来边界。因此，企业在不同的时间点，进行长期，准不可逆的承诺向某些域的能力。
部分发展竞争优势的概念，即需要同时利用现有的内部和外部企业特有的能力，并开发新的彭罗斯（1959），蒂斯（1982），晋宽（1984）。然而，只是在最近的研究人员已经开始把重点放在第一部分组织如何制定公司特定功能??的具体更新能力以应对他们如何转移这些问题是在商业环境中。公司的业务流程，市场地位和扩张路径紧密联系在一起的。最近，几位作家提供的见解和证据，企业如何发展自己的能力，以适应甚至把握瞬息万变的环境。动态能力的方法，旨在提供一个连贯的框架，既可以整合现有的概念和经验的知识，促进处方。在这样做，它是建立在熊彼特（1934），彭罗斯（1959），威廉姆森（1975年，1985年），巴尼（1986），纳尔逊和温特（1982），蒂斯（1988），蒂斯等人所提供的理论基础（1994）。
TOWARD A DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK Terminology
In order to facilitate theory development and intellectual dialogue, some acceptable definitions are desirable. We propose the following.
Factors of production
These are ‘undifferentiated’ inputs available in disaggregate form in factor markets. By undifferentiated we mean that they lack a firm-specific component. Land, unskilled labor, and capital are typical examples. Some factors may be available for the taking, such as public knowledge. In the language of Arrow, such resources must be ‘non-fugitive.’ Property rights are usually well defined for factors of production.
Resources
Resources are firm-specific assets that are difficult if not impossible to imitate. Trade secrets and certain specialized production facilities and engineering experience are examples. Such assets are difficult to transfer among firms because of transactions costs and transfer costs, and because the assets may contain tacit knowledge.
Organizational routines/competences
When firm-specific assets are assembled in integrated clusters spanning individuals and groups so that they enable distinctive activities to be performed, these activities constitute organizational routines and processes. Examples include quality, miniaturization, and systems integration. Such competences are typically viable across multiple product lines, and may extend outside the firm to embrace alliance partners.
Core competences
We define those competences that define a firm’s fundamental business as core. Core competences must accordingly be derived by looking across the range of a firm’s (and its competitors) products and services. The value of core competences can be enhanced by combination with the appropriate complementary assets. The degree to which a core competence is distinctive depends on how well endowed the firm is relative to its competitors, and on how difficult it is for competitors to replicate its competences.
Dynamic capabilities
We define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive advantage given path dependencies and market positions (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
Products
End products are the final goods and services produced by the firm based on utilizing the competences that it possesses. The performance (price, quality, etc.) of a firm’s products relative to its competitors at any point in time will depend upon its competences (which over time depend on its capabilities).
Markets and strategic capabilities
Different approaches to strategy view sources of wealth creation and the essence of the strategic problem faced by firms differently. The competitive forces framework sees the strategic problem in terms of industry structure, entry deterrence, and positioning; game-theoretic models view the strategic problem as one of interaction between rivals with certain expectations about how each other will behave; resource-based perspectives have focused on the exploitation of firm-specific assets. Each approach asks different, often complementary questions. A key step in building a conceptual framework related to dynamic capabilities is to identify the foundations upon which distinctive and difficult-to-replicate advantages can be built, maintained, and enhanced.
向动态能力框架
术语
为了促进理论的发展和知识产权对话，一些可以接受的定义是可取的。我们提出以下建议。 生产要素
这些是“??无差别的投入要素市场的建立个体形式提供。未分化，我们的意思是，他们缺乏一个坚定的特定组件。土地，非熟练劳动力和资本是典型的例子。有些因素可能会回吐，如公共知识。语言的箭头，这些资源必须是“非逃犯。产权通常定义为生产要素。
资源
资源是企业是困难的，如果不是不可能的，模仿的特定资产。商业秘密和某些专门的生产设施和工程经验的例子。这样的资产很难转移，因为企业之间的交易成本和转移成本，因为资产可能包含的隐性知识。
组织惯例/能力
当公司特定资产的组装集成集群跨越的个人和团体，让他们启用独特的活动进行，这些活动构成的组织程序和流程。例子包括质量，小型化和系统集成。通常这种能力是可行的多个产品线，可能会超出
坚定地拥抱联盟伙伴。
核心竞争力
我们定义定义一个公司的基本业务为核心的竞争力。因此，核心竞争力必须来自看着对面一个公司的（和它的竞争对手）的产品和服务的范围。结合适当的互补性资产，可以提高核心竞争力的价值。一个独特的核心竞争力是在何种程度上取决于如何赋予公司相对其竞争对手，竞争对手复制其能力是多么的困难。
动态能力
我们公司的整合能力，构建和重新配置内部和外部竞争力，以应对迅速变化的环境中定义的动态能力。因此动态能力反映一个组织的能力，以实现竞争优势的路径依赖和市场地位（伦纳德·巴顿， 1992年）的新的和创新的形式。
产品
最终产品是利用它拥有的能力的基础上由该公司生产的最终产品和服务。一个公司的产品，相对于它的竞争对手在任何时间点的性能（价格，质量等） ，将取决于它的能力（随着时间的推移，取决于其功能） 。
市场和战略能力
不同的方法策略观点创造财富的来源和不同的公司所面临的战略问题的本质。竞争力框架看到产业结构，进入威慑和定位方面的战略问题;博弈论模型查看对方将如何行为作为一个对手有一定的期望之间的相互作用有关的战略问题;集中资源为基础的观点公司特定资产的开采。每一种方法都要求不同，往往相辅相成的问题。建立一个概念框架与动态能力的一个关键步骤是确定的基础可以构建独特和难以复制的优势，保持和增强。
A useful way to vector in on the strategic elements of the business enterprise is first to identify what is not strategic. To be strategic, a capability must be honed to a user need (so there is a source of revenues), unique (so that the products/services produced can be priced without too much regard to competition) and difficult to replicate (so profits will not be competed away). Accordingly, any assets or entity which are homogeneous and can be bought and sold at an established price cannot be all that strategic (Barney, 1986). What is it, then, about firms which undergirds competitive advantage?
To answer this, one must first make some fundamental distinctions between markets and internal organization (firms). The essence of the firm, as Coase (1937) pointed out, is that it displaces market organization. It does so in the main because inside the firms one can organize certain types of economic activity in ways one cannot using markets. This is not only because of transaction costs, as Williamson (1975, 1985) emphasized, but also because there are many types of arrangements where injecting high-powered (market like) incentives might well be quite destructive of cooperative activity and learning. Inside an organization, exchange cannot take place in the same manner that it can outside an organization, not just because it might be destructive to provide high-powered individual incentives, but because it is difficult if not impossible to tightly calibrate individual contribution to a joint effort. Hence, contrary to Arrow’s (1969) view of firms as quasi markets, and the task of management to inject markets into firms, we recognize the inherent limits and possible counterproductive results of attempting to fashion firms into simply clusters of internal markets. In particular, learning and internal technology transfer may well be jeopardized.
在企业的战略要素矢量一个有用的方法是首先确定究竟是不是战略。战略，能力必须??磨练用户需要（所以有一个收入来源），唯一的（可以定价方面没有太多竞争，使产品/服务），（所以利润将难以复制不能竞争）。因此，是同质的，并且可以在一个既定的价格购买和出售任何资产或实体不能是所有战略（巴尼，1986）。这是什么话，巩固了公司的竞争优势？
要回答这个问题，首先必须做出一些根本性的市场和内部组织（企业）之间的区别。科斯（1937）指出，该公司的精髓是，它取代了市场组织。这样做，主要是因为公司内部可以组织某些类型的经济活
动方式不能利用市场。这不仅是因为交易成本，威廉姆森（1975年，1985年）强调，但也因为有多种类型的注射大功率（市场等），诱因很可能是相当破坏性的合作活动和学习安排。一个组织内部，交换不能采取相同的方式，它可以组织外部的，不只是因为它可能是破坏性的提供高倍个人奖励的，但因为它是困难的，如果不是不可能的，以紧密校准的联合的个人贡献努力。因此，阿罗（1969）鉴于公司作为准市场，并注入到企业市场管理的任务相反，我们承认尝试时尚公司成简单的集群内部市场本身固有的局限和可能适得其反的结果。尤其是，学习和内部技术转移很可能会受到损害。
Indeed, what is distinctive about firms is that they are domains for organizing activity in a nonmarket-like fashion. Accordingly, as we discuss what is distinctive about firms, we stress competences/capabilities which are ways of organizing and getting things done which cannot be accomplished merely by using the price system to coordinate activity. The very essence of most capabilities/competences is that they cannot be readily assembled through markets (Teece, 1982, 1986a; Zander and Kogut, 1995). If the ability to assemble competences using markets is what is meant by the firm as a nexus of contracts (Fama, 1980), then we unequivocally state that the firm about which we theorize cannot be usefully modeled as a nexus of contracts. By ‘contract’ we are referring to a transaction undergirded by a legal agreement, or some other arrangement which clearly spells out rights, rewards, and responsibilities. Moreover, the firm as a nexus of contracts suggests a series of bilateral contracts orchestrated by a coordinator. Our view of the firm is that the organization takes place in a more multilateral fashion, with patterns of behavior and learning being orchestrated in a much more decentralized fashion, but with a viable headquarters operation.
The key point, however, is that the properties of internal organization cannot be replicated by a portfolio of business units amalgamated just through formal contracts as many distinctive elements of internal organization simply cannot be replicated in the market. That is, entrepreneurial activity cannot lead to the immediate replication of unique organizational skills through simply entering a market and piecing the parts together overnight. Replication takes time, and the replication of best practice may be illusive. Indeed, firm capabilities need to be understood not in terms of balance sheet items, but mainly in terms of the organizational structures and managerial processes which support productive activity. By construction, the firm’s balance sheet contains items that can be valued, at least at original market prices (cost). It is necessarily the case, therefore, that the balance sheet is a poor shadow of a firm’s distinctive competences. That which is distinctive cannot be bought and sold short of buying the firm itself, or one or more of its subunits.
事实上，有关企业的特色是什么，他们是一个类似非市场的方式组织活动领域。因此，我们讨论什么是有关企业的特色，我们强调的能力/功能的方式组织和做事情不能仅仅通过价格体系来协调活动完成。大多数功能/能力的本质是，他们不能很容易地组装通过市场（蒂斯， 1982 ， 1986A ; Zander和古特， 1995年） 。如果组装能力利用市场的能力是由该公司作为一个承上启下的合约（FAMA ，1980）是什么意思，然后我们明确的说法，这是我们坚决不能被有效地建模为一个承上启下的合同。我们通过“契约”是指到一个的交易undergirded的法律协议，或一些其他安排，明确规定了权利，奖励和责任。此外，该公司作为一个承上启下的合同，由协调策划了一系列双边合同。我们认为该公司是该组织采取更加多边化的方式，行为和学习在一个更加分散的方式策划模式，但一个可行的总部运营。
但是，关键的一点是由许多独特的元素内部组织根本无法在市场上复制合并只是通过正式合同业务单位组合，内部组织不能被复制。也就是说，创业活动不能导致立即复制独特的组织能力，通过简单地进入市场和零件拼凑在一起过夜。复制需要时间，而且可能是虚幻的复制最佳实践。事实上，企业能力需要理解资产负债表项目方面，但主要是在支持生产活动的组织结构和管理流程。建设，公司的资产负债表包含的项目，可以进行估值，至少在原有的市场价格（成本） 。因此，这是必然的情况下，企业的独特能力，资产负债表是一个贫穷的阴影。这是鲜明的不能买，卖短买公司本身，或一个或多个亚基。
There are many dimensions of the business firm that must be understood if one is to grasp firm-level distinctive competences/capabilities. In this paper we merely identify several classes of factors that will help
determine a firm’s distinctive competence and dynamic capabilities. We organize these in three categories: processes, positions, and paths. The essence of competences and capabilities is embedded in organizational processes of one kind or another. But the content of these processes and the opportunities they afford for developing competitive advantage at any point in time are shaped significantly by the assets the firm possesses (internal and market) and by the evolutionary path it has adopted/inherited. Hence organizational processes, shaped by the firm’s asset positions and molded by its evolutionary and co-evolutionary paths, explain the essence of the firm’s dynamic capabilities and its competitive advantage.
有许多方面的商业企业，必须了解如果一个人掌握公司独特的竞争力/能力。在本文中，我们只是确定几类因素，这将有助于确定企业的独特能力和动态能力。我们组织这些在三类：流程，持仓和路径。本质的能力和功能是嵌入在组织过程中一种或另一种。但这些过程的内容和发展的竞争优势，在任何时间点的机会，他们买不起的形状由公司拥有的资产（内部和市场），它采用的进化路径/继承显着。因此，组织流程，公司的资产的位置和形状，塑造其进化和协同进化的路径，解释公司的动态能力与竞争优势的本质
Processes, positions, and paths
We thus advance the argument that the competitive advantage of firms lies with its managerial and organizational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset position, and the paths available to it. By managerial and organizational processes, we refer to the way things are done in the firm, or what might be referred to as its routines, or patterns of current practice and learning. By position we refer to its current specific endowments of technology, intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and its external relations with suppliers and complementors. By paths we refer to the strategic alternatives available to the firm, and the presence or absence of increasing returns and attendant path dependencies.
Our focus throughout is on asset structures for which no ready market exists, as these are the only assets of strategic interest. A final section focuses on replication and imitation, as it is these phenomena which determine how readily a competence or capability can be cloned by competitors, and therefore distinctiveness of its competences and the durability of its advantage.
The firm’s processes and positions collectively encompass its competences and capabilities. A hierarchy of competences/capabilities ought to be recognized, as some competences may be on the factory floor, some in the R&D labs, some in the executive suites, and some in the way everything is integrated. A difficult-to-replicate or difficult-to-imitate competence was defined earlier as a distinctive competence. As indicated, the key feature of distinctive competence is that there is not a market for it, except possibly through the market for business units. Hence competences and capabilities are intriguing assets as they typically must be built because they cannot be bought.
过程，位置和路径
因此，我们推进的说法，公司的竞争优势在于管理和组织流程，塑造了它的（具体）资产状况，它可用路径。通过管理和组织的过程中，我们将在公司做事的方式，或可能被称为例程，或目前的实践和学习模式。通过位置，我们参考其当前的具体技术禀赋，知识产权，资产互补，客户群，及其外部供应商和互补的关系。通过我们的战略选择该公司，并增加回报以及随之而来的路径依赖的存在或不存在的路径。
我们的重点始终是资产结构的存在，没有现成的市场，因为这是战略利益的唯一资产。最后一节侧重于复制和模仿，不如说是这些现象决定随手一可以克隆的能力或能力的竞争对手，因此其能力的独特性和耐久性的优势。
该公司的流程和岗位统称包括其才能和能力。层次结构的能力/能力应该得到认可，因为有些能力可能是在工厂车间，一些在R＆D实验室，在行政套房，以及一些在路上一切都集成。 ?难以复制或难以
模仿的竞争力先前定义为一个独特的竞争力。正如所指出的，独特的竞争力的关键特征是，有没有它的市场，可能除了通过业务单位的市场。因此，能力和能力是耐人寻味的资产，因为它们通常必须建立，因为他们可以买不来的。
Organizational and managerial processes
Organizational processes have three roles: coordination/integration (a static concept); learning (a dynamic concept); and reconfiguration (a transformational concept). We discuss each in turn.
Coordination/integration. While the price system supposedly coordinates the economy, managers coordinate or integrate activity inside the firm. How efficiently and effectively internal coordination or integration is achieved is very important (Aoki, 1990). Likewise for external coordination. Increasingly, strategic advantage requires the integration of external activities and technologies. The growing literature on strategic alliances, the virtual corporation, and buyer–supplier relations and technology collaboration evidences the importance of external integration and sourcing.
组织和管理流程
组织过程中有三个角色：协调/整合（一个静态的概念），学习（一个动态的概念），以及重新配置（一个转型的概念）。我们依次讨论。
协调/整合。虽然价格体系理应协调经济，管理者在公司内部协调或整合活动。如何高效率，实现有效的内部协调或整合是非常重要的（青木，1990）。同样的外部协调。越来越多的战略优势需要外部活动和技术的整合。战略联盟，虚拟企业，买家和供应商的关系和技术协作证据的外部集成和采购的重要性，越来越多的文献。
There is some field-based empirical research that provides support for the notion that the way production is organized by management inside the firm is the source of differences in firms’ competence in various domains. For example, Garvin’s (1988) study of 18 room air-conditioning plants reveals that quality performance was not related to either capital investment or the degree of automation of the facilities. Instead, quality performance was driven by special organizational routines. These included routines for gathering and processing information, for linking customer experiences with engineering design choices, and for coordinating factories and component suppliers. The work of Clark and Fujimoto (1991) on project development in the automobile industry also illustrates the role played by coordinative routines. Their study reveals a significant degree of variation in how different firms coordinate the various activities required to bring a new model from concept to market. These differences in coordinative routines and capabilities seem to have a significant impact on such performance variables as development cost, development lead times, and quality. Furthermore, Clark and Fujimoto tended to find significant firm-level differences in coordination routines and these differences seemed to have persisted for a long time. This suggests that routines related to coordination are firm-specific in nature.
有一些基于实证研究,提供了对这一理念的支持,生产是由管理公司在内部是源泉的差异在公司的能力在不同的域。例如,加文(1988)的研究显示,18个房间空调工厂质量性能是不相关的,要么资本投资或自动化程度的设施。相反,质量性能是由特殊的组织惯例。这些包括用于收集和处理信息的例程,为连接客户的经验与工程设计选择、协调工厂和组件供应商。克拉克的作品和藤本(1991)在项目发展的汽车工业也说明了协调程序扮演的角色。他们的研究揭示了一个重要程度的变化在不同的公司如何协调各种活动需要带一个新的模型从概念到市场。这些差异在同等的例程和能力似乎已经严重影响这些性能变量作为开发成本、开发交货期和质量。此外,克拉克和藤本倾向于发现显着差异的例程和公司级协调这些差异似乎已经持续了很长时间。这表明,例程相关协调是企业特有的自然。
Also, the notion that competence/capability is embedded in distinct ways of coordinating and combining helps to explain how and why seemingly minor technological changes can have devastating impacts on incumbent firms’ abilities to compete in a market. Henderson and Clark (1990), for example, have shown that
incumbments in the photolithographic equipment industry were sequentially devasted by seemingly minor innovations that, nevertheless, had major impacts on how systems had to be configured. They attribute these difficulties to the fact that systems-level or ‘architectural’ innovations often require new routines to integrate and coordinate engineering tasks. These findings and others suggest that productive systems display high interdependency, and that it may not be possible to change one level without changing others. This appears to be true with respect to the ‘lean production’ model (Womack et al., 1991) which has now transformed the Taylor or Ford model of manufacturing organization in the automobile industry. Lean production requires distinctive shop floor practices and processes as well as distinctive higher-order managerial processes. Put differently, organizational processes often display high levels of coherence, and when they do, replication may be difficult because it requires systemic changes throughout the organization and also among inter-organizational linkages, which might be very hard to effectuate. Put differently, partial imitation or replication of a successful model may yield zero benefits.
此外，能力/能力的概念，被嵌入以不同的方式的协调和结合有助于解释如何和为什么看似微小的技术变化可能产生破坏性的影响在位企业在市场中竞争的能力。亨德森和克拉克（1990），例如，已经表明，，光刻设备行业incumbments依次devasted的看似微小的创新，不过，有重大影响的系统如何进行配置。归因于这些困难的事实，系统级或建筑的创新往往需要新的例程，??以整合和协调工程任务。这些发现和其他生产系统显示相互依赖性高，它可能无法改变一个不改变别人的水平。这似乎是真实的“精益生产”模式（沃麦克等，1991），现在已经改变了泰勒和福特在汽车行业的生产组织模式。精益生产需要独特的车间实践和过程，以及独特的高阶管理流程。换句话说，组织过程往往显示高层次的连贯性，当他们这样做，复制可能是困难的，因为它需要整个组织和组织间的联系中，这可能是很难招致系统性变化。换言之，部分模仿或复制一个成功的模式可能会产生零好处。
The notion that there is a certain rationality or?coherence to processes and systems is not quite?the same concept as corporate culture, as we?understand the latter. Corporate culture refers to?the values and beliefs that employees hold; culture can be a de facto governance system as it?mediates the behavior of individuals and economizes on more formal administrative methods.?Rationality or coherence notions are more akin?to the Nelson and Winter (1982) notion of organizational routines. However, the routines concept?is a little too amorphous to properly capture?the congruence amongst processes and between?processes and incentives that we have in mind.?Consider a professional service organization like?an accounting firm. If it is to have relatively?high-powered
incentives
that
reward
individual?performance,
then
it
must
build
organizational?processes that channel individual behavior; if it?has weak or low-powered incentives, it must find?symbolic ways to recognize the high performers,?and it must use alternative methods to build effort?and enthusiasm. What one may think of as styles?of organization in fact contain necessary, not?discretionary, elements to achieve performance.??
认为有一定的合理性和一致性,流程和系统是不完全相同的概念作为企业文化,为我们理解后者。企业文化指的是价值观和信仰,员工持有;文化可以成为一个事实上的治理系统,因为它调和了个体行为和简化更正式的管理方法。理性或相干性观念更类似于尼尔森和冬季(1982)的概念,组织惯例。然而,这个例程的概念有点太无定形正确捕获在流程和流程之间的一致性和激励,我们已经在心里。考虑一个专业服务组织就像一个会计事务所。如果它是有相对高能的激励措施,奖励个人的绩效,那么它必须建立组织过程通道个人行为;如果它有弱或低功率的激励,它必须找到象征性的方式肯定高的表演者,它必须使用替代方法来构建努力和热情。什么人可能认为的风格的组织实际上包含必要的,不是任意的,元素来实现性能。
?Recognizing the congruence’s and complementarities among processes, and between processes?and incentives, is critical to the understanding of?organizational capabilities. In particular, they can?help us explain why architectural and radical?innovations are so often introduced into an industry by new entrants. The incumbents develop?distinctive organizational processes that cannot?support the new technology, despite
certain overt?similarities between the old and the new. The?frequent failure of incumbents to introduce new?technologies can thus be seen as a consequence?of the mismatch that so often exists between the?set of organizational processes needed to support?the conventional product/service and the requirements of the new. Radical organizational re-?engineering will usually be required to support?the new product, which may well do better?embedded in a separate subsidiary where a new?set of coherent organizational processes can be??fashioned.??
组织能力的理解，认识到流程，流程和激励机制之间的一致性和互补性，是至关重要的。特别是，他们可以帮助我们解释为什么建筑和激进的创新往往都引入一个行业新进入者。现任开发独特的组织过程，不能支持新技术，尽管新旧之间的某些明显的相似之处。频繁失败的老牌企业，引进新技术，由此可以看出，作为一个后果，所以经常需要支持传统的产品/服务和新的要求组织流程的集合之间存在的不匹配。激进的组织，通常需要重新设计，以支持新产品，这可能会做的更好嵌入了一套新的协调一致的组织流程可以塑造一个的子公司。
?Learning. Perhaps even more important than?integration is learning. Learning is a process by?which repetition and experimentation enable tasks?to be performed better and quicker. It also enables??new production opportunities to be identified.?In the context of the firm, if not more generally,?learning has several key characteristics. First,?learning involves organizational as well as individual skills. While individual skills are of relevance, their value depends upon their employment, in particular organizational settings.?Learning processes are intrinsically social and?collective and occur not only through the imitation and emulation of individuals, as with?teacher–student or master–apprentice, but also?because of joint contributions to the understanding of complex problems. Learning requires?common codes of communication and coordinated?search procedures. Second, the organizational?knowledge generated by such activity resides in?new patterns of activity, in ‘routines,’ or a new?logic of organization. As indicated earlier, routines are patterns of interactions that represent?successful solutions to particular problems. These?patterns of interaction are resident in group?behavior, though certain subroutines may be resident in individual behavior. The concept of?dynamic capabilities as a coordinative management process opens the door to the potential?for inter-organizational learning. Researchers (Doz?and Shuen, 1990; Mody, 1993) have pointed out?that collaborations and partnerships can be a?vehicle for new organizational learning, helping?firms to recognize dysfunctional routines, and?preventing strategic blindspots.
学习。也许比整合更为重要的是学习。学习是一个过程，其中的重复和实验使要执行的任务更好，
更快。这也使新的生产机会加以鉴别。在该公司的背景下，如果没有更普遍，学习有几个关键特征。首先，学习涉及的组织以及个人技能。虽然个人技术相关，其价值取决于他们的就业机会，在特定的组织设置。学习过程本质上是社会和集体的发生不仅通过个人的模仿和仿真，与师生或师徒，也因为复杂的问题的理解共同缴费。学习需要共同的沟通和协调搜索程序代码。二，组织这样的活动所产生的知识驻留在活动的新模式，在“套路，或一个新的组织逻辑。如前所述，程序是代表成功解决特定问题的交互模式。居住在这些互动模式群体行为，尽管某些子程序可能是居民个人行为。协调管理过程的动态能力的概念，打开门组织间学习的潜力。研究人员（打和船，1990;么，1993年）已指出，合作和伙伴关系可以是车辆的新的组织学习，帮助企业认识到不正常的例程，防止战略盲点。
?Reconfiguration and transformation. In rapidly?changing environments, there is obviously value?in the ability to sense the need to reconfigure?the firm’s asset structure, and to accomplish the?necessary internal and external transformation?(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Langlois, 1994).?This requires constant surveillance of markets and?technologies and the willingness to adopt best?practice. In this regard, benchmarking is of considerable value as an organized process for?accomplishing such ends (Camp, 19). In?dynamic environments, narcissistic organizations?are likely to be impaired. The capacity to reconfigure and transform is itself a learned organizational skill. The more frequently practiced, the?easier accomplished.?
Change is costly and so firms must develop?processes to minimize low pay-off change. The?ability to calibrate the requirements for change?and to effectuate the necessary adjustments would?appear to depend on the ability to scan the?environment, to evaluate markets and competitors,?and to quickly accomplish reconfiguration and?transformation ahead of competition. Decentralization and local autonomy assist these processes.?Firms that have honed these capabilities are?sometimes referred to as ‘high-flex’.
重新配置和改造。在瞬息万变的环境中，有明显的价值感，需要重新配置公司的资产结构，并
完成必要的内部和外部环境的变革（阿米特和苏梅克尔的，1993的能力;朗格卢瓦，1994）。这需要市场和技术的不断监视愿意采用最佳实践。在这方面，标杆是相当大的价值作为一个有组织的过程中为实现这一目的（营，19）。在动态的环境中，自恋组织可能会减值。重新配置的能力，改造本身是一个博学多才的组织能力。实行更频繁，更容易完成。
变化是昂贵的，所以企业必须开发进程，以减少低支付的变化。校准变化的要求，以实践进行必要的调整能力似乎取决于环境扫描，以评估市场和竞争对手，并迅速实现竞争优势的重新配置和改造的能力。权力下放和地方自治协助这些进程。磨刀了这些功能的商行，有时简称为“高柔性'。
?Positions?
The strategic posture of a firm is determined not?only by its learning processes and by the coherence of its internal and external processes and?incentives, but also by its specific assets. By?specific assets we mean for example its specialized plant and equipment. These include its?difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and assets?complementary to them, as well as its reputational?and relational assets. Such assets determine its?competitive advantage at any point in time. We?identify several illustrative classes.
?Technological assets. While there is an emerging market for know-how (Teece, 1981), much?technology does not enter it. This is either?because the firm is unwilling to sell it?or? because of difficulties in transacting in the market?for know-how (Teece, 1980). A firm’s technological assets may or may not be protected by?the standard instruments of intellectual property?law. Either way, the ownership protection and?utilization of technological assets are clearly key?differentiators among firms. Likewise for complementary assets.
Complementary assets. Technological innovations require the use of certain related assets?to produce and deliver new products and services.?Prior commercialization activities require and?enable firms to build such complementarities?(Teece, 1986b). Such capabilities and assets,?while necessary for the firm’s established activities, may have other uses as well. These assets?typically lie downstream. New products and processes either can enhance or destroy the value of?such assets (Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli,?1986). Thus the development of computers?enhanced the value of IBM’s direct sales force?in office products, while disk brakes rendered?useless much of the auto industry’s investment?in drum brakes.?位置
不仅通过其学习过程，其内部和外部流程和激励机制的连贯性，而且还通过其特定的资产确定一个公司的战略态势。通过特定资产，例如，我们的意思是其专门的厂房及设备。这些措施包括其难以对行业的知识资产和他们的互补性资产，以及其声誉和关系资产。该等资产在任何时间点确定其竞争优势。我们确定几个说明性类。
?技术资产。虽然是一个新兴的市场，诀窍（蒂斯，1981），多技术并没有进入它。这是因为企
业是不愿把它卖掉，或者是因为困难，在市场上进行交易的诀窍（蒂斯，1980）。一个公司的技术资产可能会或可能不会知识产权法律保护的标准工具。无论哪种方式，技术资产的所有权保护和利用显然是企业之间的关键区别。同样的互补性资产。
互补性资产。技术创新需要使用某些相关资产的生产和提供新的产品和服务。之前的商业活动
需要，使公司能够建立这样的互补性，（蒂斯1986b）。这样的能力和资产，同时为公司的既定活动所必需，可能有其他用途。这些资产通常位于下游。新产品和新工艺可以提高或销毁这类资产的价值（图什曼，纽曼，和Romanelli，1986）。因此，计算机的发展增强了IBM的办公产品的直接销售队伍，而盘式制动器形同虚设鼓式制动器在汽车行业的投资。
Financial assets. In the short run, a firm’s cash?position and degree of leverage may have strategic implications. While there is nothing more?fungible than cash, it cannot always be raised?from external markets without the dissemination?of considerable information to potential investors.?Accordingly, what a firm can do in short order?is often a function of its balance sheet. In the?longer run, that ought not be so, as cash flow?ought be more determinative.?
Reputational assets. Firms, like individuals,?have reputations. Reputations often summarize a?good deal of information about firms and shape?the responses of customers, suppliers, and competitors. It is sometimes difficult to disentangle?reputation from the firm’s current asset and market position. However, in our view, reputational?assets are best viewed as an intangible asset that?enables firms to achieve various goals in the?market. Its main value is external, since what is?critical about reputation is that it is a kind of?summary statistic about the firm’s current assets?and position, and its likely future behavior.?Because there is generally a strong asymmetry?between what is known inside the firm and what?is known externally, reputations may sometimes?be more salient than the true state of affairs, in?the sense that external actors must respond to?what they know rather than what is knowable.?
Structural assets. The formal and informal?structure of organizations and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and?direction of innovation, and how competences?and capabilities co-evolve (Argyres, 1995; Teece,?1996). The degree of hierarchy and the level of?vertical and lateral integration are elements of??firm-specific structure. Distinctive governance?modes can be recognized (e.g., multiproduct, integrated firms; high ‘flex’ firms; virtual corporations; conglomerates), and these modes support?different types of innovation to a greater or lesser?degree. For instance, virtual structures work well?when innovation is autonomous; integrated structures work better for systemic innovations.
金融资产。从短期来看，企业的现金状况及杠杆程度可能具有战略意义。虽然没有什么比现金更
可替代的，它不能总是从外部市场筹集不传播大量的信息给潜在投资者。因此，企业可以在短期内做什么，往往是其资产负债表的功能。从长远来看，这不应该是这样，作为现金流量应该是决定性的。
声誉资产。企业，个人一样，有声誉。声誉经常总结了大量的有关公司的信息和塑造客户，供应
商和竞争对手的反应。有时很难分清是从公司目前的资产和市场地位的声誉。然而，在我们看来，是最好的声誉资产看作是一种无形的资产，使企业能够在市场上实现各种目标。它的主要价值是外在的，因为信誉是关键，有关该公司的流动资产和位置，及未来可能的行为，它是一种简易统计。因为一般有强烈的不对称什么是已知的在公司内部和外部被称为之间，声誉有时比真实状况更加突出，在这个意义上，外部参与者必须回应他们知道什么，而不是什么是可知。
资产结构。正式和非正式的组织结构，其对外联系有重要影响创新的速度和方向，以及如何竞争
力和能力共同发展（Argyres，1995;蒂斯，1996）。层次结构和水平，垂直和横向整合的程度，是公司特定结构的元素。独特的治理模式可以确认（例如，多产品的综合性公司;高'柔性'企业，虚拟企业，企业集团），这些模式或大或小的程度上支持不同类型的创新。例如，虚拟结构的工作是自主创新;综合结构的工作更好地为制度创新。
?Institutional assets. Environments cannot be?defined in terms of markets alone. While public?policies are usually recognized as important in?constraining what firms can do, there is a tendency, particularly by economists, to see these?as acting through markets or through incentives.?However, institutions themselves are a critical?element of the business environment. Regulatory?systems, as well as intellectual property regimes,?tort laws, and antitrust laws, are also part of the?environment. So is the system of higher education?and national culture. There are significant national?differences here, which is just one of the reasons?geographic location matters (Nelson, 1994). Such?assets may not be entirely firm specific; firms of?different national and regional origin may have?quite different institutional assets to call upon?because their institutional/policy settings are so?different.?
Market (structure) assets. Product market position matters, but it is often not at all determinative of the fundamental position of the enterprise?in its external environment. Part of the problem?lies in defining the market in which a firm competes in a way that gives economic meaning.?More importantly, market position in regimes of?rapid technological change is often extremely?fragile. This is in part because time moves on a??different clock in such environments. ?Moreover,?the link between market share and innovation has?long been broken, if it ever existed (Teece, 1996).?All of this is to suggest that product market?position, while important, is too often overplayed.?Strategy should be formulated with regard to the?more fundamental aspects of firm performance,?which we believe are rooted in competences and?capabilities and shaped by positions and paths.?Organizational boundaries. An important?dimension of ‘position’ is the location of a firm’s?boundaries. Put differently, the degree of integration (vertical, lateral, and horizontal) is of?quite some significance. Boundaries are not only?significant with respect to the technological and?complementary assets contained within, but also?with respect to the nature of the coordination that?can be achieved internally as compared to through?markets. When specific assets or poorly protected?intellectual capital are at issue, pure market?arrangements expose the parties to reconstructing?hazards or appropriability hazards. In such circumstances, hierarchical control structures may work better than pure arms-length contracts.
机构资产。环境不能被定义在单独的市场。虽然公共通常认为是重要的，在制约企业可以做
什么，有一种倾向，特别是经济学家，看到这些通过市场或通过激励机制行事。然而，机构本身的营商环境的一个关键要素。监管制度，以及知识产权制度，侵权法，反托拉斯法，也都是环境的一部分。原来是高等教育系统和民族文化。有显着的民族差异，这仅仅是一个地理位置的原因事项（尼尔森，1994年） 。这些资产可能不完全公司特定公司不同国家和地区的起源可能有相当不同的机构资产呼吁，因为他们的/设置是如此不同。
市场（结构）的资产。产品市场PO位置事宜，但它往往是决定在其外部环境对企业的基本立
场。问题的部分原因在于，在界定市场中，一个企业竞争的方式，使经济意义。更重要的是，制度的市场地位，快速的技术变革往往是极其脆弱的。这部分是因为在这样的环境中在不同的时钟的时间移动。此外，市场份额和创新之间的联系早已被打破，如果它的存在（蒂斯，1996） 。所有这一切都表明，产品的市场地位虽然重要，但往往过于夸大。战略应制定关于企业绩效更根本的方面，我们相信这才能和能力都植根于形状位置和路径。组织边界。 “位置”的一个重要方面，是企业的边界的位置。换句话说，集成度（纵向，横向和水平）是颇有些意义。边界是相对于内包含的技术和互补性资产不仅显着，而且还相对于协调的性质，可以实现内部相比，通过市场。当特定的资产或保护不力的智力资本的问题，纯粹的市场安排，令各方重建危害或独占危害。在这种情况下，分层控制结构可能会更好地工作比纯的武器合同。
?Paths
?Path dependencies. Where a firm can go is a?function of its current position and the paths?ahead. Its current position is often shaped by?the path it has traveled. In standard economics?textbooks, firms have an infinite range of technologies from which they can choose and markets?they can occupy. Changes in product or factor?prices will be responded to instantaneously, with?technologies moving in and out according to?value maximization criteria. Only in the short run?are irreversibilities recognized. Fixed costs—such?as equipment and overheads—cause firms to price?below fully amortized costs but never constrain?future investment choices. ‘Bygones are bygones.’?Path dependencies are simply not recognized.?This is a major limitation of microeconomic?theory.?
The notion of path dependencies recognizes?that ‘history matters.’ Bygones are rarely?bygones, despite the predictions of rational actor?theory. Thus a firm’s previous investments and?its repertoire of routines (its ‘history’) constrain??its future behavior. This follows because learning tends to be local. That is, opportunities for?learning will be ‘close in’ to previous activities?and thus will be transaction and production specific (Teece,
1988). This is because learning is?often a process of trial, feedback, and evaluation.?If too many parameters are changed simultaneously, the ability of firms to conduct meaningful natural quasi experiments is attenuated. If?many aspects of a firm’s learning environment?change simultaneously, the ability to ascertain?cause–effect relationships is confounded because?cognitive structures will not be formed and rates?of learning diminish as a result. One implication?is that many investments are much longer term?than is commonly thought.?路径
?路径的依赖。企业可以去，是其当前的位置和未来的路径的函数。它目前的位置往往是塑造它已经走过的路径。在标准的经济学教科书中，公司有一个无限的范围内，他们可以选择的技术和市场，他们可以占据。在产品或生产要素价格的变化将在瞬间作出回应，移入和移出的技术价值最大化标准。只有在短期内不可逆性的认可。固定费用，如设备和间接成本因公司价格低于完全摊销成本，但不会未来的投资选择。 “过去的都是过去的事。”路径依赖根本不承认。这是一个重要的微观经济理论的。
路径依赖的概念认识，“历史问题。”既往不咎很少既往不咎，尽管理性行动者理论的预测。因此，一个公司的以往的投资和它的剧目例程（它的“历史”）其未来的行为。在此之前，因为学习往往是本地的。也就是说，学习的机会将是'关闭'以前的活动，从而将交易和生产的具体（蒂斯，1988）。这是因为，学习是通常的处理的试验中，反馈和评价。如果太多的参数同时改变，公司进行有意义的天然准实验的能力衰减。如果一个企业的学习环境的许多方面同时改变，确定因果关系的能力混淆，因为认知结构不会形成，由于学习率减少。一个含义是，许多投资是远远比通常被认为较长期的。
The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing returns to?adoption exist. This is a demand-side phenomenon, and it tends to make technologies and?products embodying those technologies more?attractive the more they are adopted. Attractiveness flows from the greater adoption of the product amongst users, which in turn enables them to?become more developed and hence more useful.?Increasing returns to adoption has many sources?including network externalities (Katz and Shapiro,?1985), the presence of complementary assets?(Teece, 1986b) and supporting infrastructure?(Nelson, 1996), learning by using (Rosenberg,?1982), and scale economies in production and?distribution. Competition between and amongst?technologies is shaped by increasing returns.?Early leads won by good luck or special circumstances (Arthur, 1983) can become amplified by?increasing returns. This is not to suggest that?first movers necessarily win. Because increasing?returns have multiple sources, the prior positioning of firms can affect their capacity to exploit?increasing returns. Thus, in Mitchell’s (19)?study of medical diagnostic imaging, firms?already controlling the relevant complementary?assets could in theory start last and finish first.
?In the presence of increasing returns, firms can?compete passively, or they may compete strategically through technology-sponsoring activities.?The first type of competition is not unlike biological competition amongst species, although it can?be sharpened by managerial activities that?enhance the performance of products and processes. The reality is that companies with the best?products will not always win, as chance events?may cause ‘lock-in’ on inferior technologies?(Arthur, 1983) and may even in special cases?generate switching costs for consumers. However,?while switching costs may favor the incumbent,?in regimes of rapid technological change switching costs can become quickly swamped by?switching benefits. Put differently, new products?employing different standards often appear with?alacrity in market environments experiencing?rapid technological change, and incumbents can?be readily challenged by superior products and?services that yield switching benefits. Thus the?degree to which switching costs cause ‘lock-in’?is a function of factors such as user learning,?rapidity of technological change, and the amount?of ferment in the competitive environment.?
路径依赖的重要性被放大存在报酬递增收养的条件。这是一个需求方的现象，然而，它往往体现这些技术更具吸引力的越多，他们采用的技术和产品。吸引力流量通过对产品从更大的用户之间，这反过来又使他们变得更加发达，因此更加有用。报酬递增采纳有许多来源，包括网络外部性（Katz和Shapiro ，1985） ，存在互补性资产（蒂斯， 1986b ）和配套基础设施（尼尔森， 1996年） ，学习使用（罗森堡， 1982年） ，和规模经济生产和分配。之间的竞争，其中包括技术，形成报酬递增。早期导致赢得
了好运气，或特殊情况（亚瑟，1983）可以成为报酬递增放大。这是不是表明，先行者不一定会赢。因为越来越多的回报有多个来源，以前的定位会影响企业利用自己的能力，越来越多的回报。因此，在医疗诊断成像米切尔（ 19）的研究，公司已经控制的相关互补性资产在理论上可以开始最后和第一完成。
?在报酬递增的存在，企业可以被动竞争，或者他们可能会通过技术赞助活动的战略竞争。第一种类型的比赛是没有什么不同生物物种之间的竞争，虽然它可以被削尖的管理活动，提高产品和工艺性能。现实的情况是，用最好的产品，公司不会总是赢，因为偶然事件可能造成'锁'上逊色技术（亚瑟，1983） ，即使在特殊情况下可能产生消费者的转换成本。然而，转换成本的同时，可能有利于现任，在技术日新月异的转换成本的制度，可以成为迅速淹没切换福利。不同，采用不同标准的新产品往往会出现美滋滋的市场环境经历着快速的技术变革，在职人员可以很容易地通过优质的产品和服务产生开关的好处提出质疑。因此在何种程度上转换成本原因'锁'是一个功能的因素，如用户学习，快速的技术变革，并在竞争激烈的环境中发酵。
Technological opportunities. The concept of?path dependencies is given forward meaning?through the consideration of an industry’s technological opportunities. It is well recognized that?how far and how fast a particular area of industrial activity can proceed is in part due to the?technological opportunities that lie before it. Such?opportunities are usually a lagged function of?foment and diversity in basic science, and the?rapidity with which new scientific breakthroughs?are being made.?
However, technological opportunities may not?be completely exogenous to industry, not only?because some firms have the capacity to engage?in or at least support basic research, but also?because technological opportunities are often fed?by innovative activity itself. Moreover, the recognition of such opportunities is affected by the?organizational structures that link the institutions?engaging in basic research (primarily the?university) to the business enterprise. Hence, the?existence of technological opportunities can be?quite firm specific.
?Important for our purposes is the rate and?direction in which relevant scientific frontiers are?being rolled back. Firms engaging in R&D may?find the path dead ahead closed off, though breakthroughs in related areas may be sufficiently close?to be attractive. Likewise, if the path dead ahead?is extremely attractive, there may be no incentive?for firms to shift the allocation of resources away?from traditional pursuits. The depth and width of?technological opportunities in the neighborhood?of a firm’s prior research activities thus are likely?to impact a firm’s options with respect to both?the amount and level of R&D activity that it?can justify. In addition, a firm’s past experience?conditions the alternatives management is able to?perceive. Thus, not only do firms in the same?industry face ‘menus’ with different costs associated with particular technological choices, they?also are looking at menus containing different?choices. 技术的机会。路径依赖的概念的含义给出了一个行业的技术机会通过审议。众所周知，工业活动的特定区域可以继续多远和多快的部分原因是由于技术的机会面前。这样的机会通常罨和多样性的基础科学的滞后函数，并迅速与正在作出新的科学突破。
然而，技术的机会可能不会完全外生的行业，不仅因为一些企业有能力从事或至少支持基础研究，但因为技术的机会也往往是由美联储创新活动本身。此外，识别连结机构从事基础研究（主要是大学）企业的组织结构，这样的机会是受。因此，存在的技术的机会，可以是相当坚定特定。
?我们的目的，重要的是相关的科学前沿正在回退的速度和方向。从事研发的企业可能会发现正前方的路径关闭了，但在相关领域的突破可能会足够接近是有吸引力的。同样，如果正前方的道路是非常有吸引力的，有可能是没有激励企业资源的分配转移，从传统的追求。因此，在附近一家公司的事先研究活动的深度和广度的技术机会的数量和水平的R＆D活动，它可以证明就可能影响企业的股权。此外，一家公司的过去的经验条件的替代品的管理是能够感知。因此，不仅企业在同行业的'菜单'的脸特别的技术选择不同的相关费用，他们也正在寻找在菜单中包含不同的选择。
?Assessment
?The essence of a firm’s competence and dynamic?capabilities is presented here as being resident in?the
firm’s organizational processes, that are in?turn shaped by the firm’s assets (positions) and its?evolutionary path. Its evolutionary path, despite?managerial hubris that might suggest otherwise,? is often rather narrow.?What the firm can do?and where it can go are thus rather constrained?by its positions and paths. Its competitors are?likewise constrained. Rents (profits) thus tend to?flow not just from the asset structure of the firm?and, as we shall see, the degree of its imitability,?but also by the firm’s ability to reconfigure and?transform.
?The parameters we have identified for determining performance are quite different from?those in the standard textbook theory of the firm,?and in the competitive forces and strategic conflict??approaches to the firm and to strategy. Moreover, the agency theoretic view of the firm as a?nexus of contracts would put no weight on processes, positions, and paths. While agency?approaches to the firm may recognize that opportunism and shirking may limit what a firm can?do, they do not recognize the opportunities and?constraints imposed by processes, positions, and?paths.
Moreover, the firm in our conceptualization is?much more than the sum of its parts—or a team??tied together by contracts.?Indeed, to some extent individuals can be moved in and out of?organizations and, so long as the internal processes and structures remain in place, performance? will not necessarily be impaired. A shift in the?environment is a far more serious threat to the?firm than is the loss of key individuals, as individuals can be replaced more readily than organizations can be transformed. Furthermore, the?dynamic capabilities view of the firm would suggest that the behavior and performance of particular firms may be quite hard to replicate, even?if its coherence and rationality are observable.?This matter and related issues involving replication and imitation are taken up in the section?that follows.?
评定
?一个公司的能力和动态能力的本质是这里作为居住在公司的组织过程，这是由公司的资产及其进化路径（位置）的转形。它的进化路径，尽管管理狂妄自大，否则可能会建议，往往是相当窄。什么公司可以做的，因此，它可以去，而受制于其位置和路径。其竞争对手也同样约束。因此，租金（利润）往往只是从公司的资产结构，流向不，我们将看到，它的可模仿性程度，也由该公司的能力进行重新配置和改造。
?决定性能的参数我们已经确定有很大的不同，那些在标准的教科书理论的坚定，并在竞争力和战略冲突接近的坚定和策略。此外，该机构的理论观点的坚定作为承上启下的合同将不重过程，位置和路径。虽然代理公司的方法可能会认识到，机会主义和推卸可能会企业可以做什么，他们不认识的进程，位置和路径的机遇和。
此外，该公司在我们的概念是远远超过其部分的总和或合同捆绑在一起的团队。事实上，在一定程度上的个人可以移入和移出的组织内部的流程和结构，只要留在原地，性能将不会必然受损。环境中的一个转变是一个更为严重的威胁的坚定比关键人物的损失，因为个人可以更换更容易比组织可以转化。此外，鉴于公司动态能力将表明，特定公司的行为和性能可能非常难以复制的，即使它的连贯性和理性的观察。这个问题，并采取了相关的问题，涉及的复制和模仿，在后面的部分。
Replicability and imitatability of?organizational processes and positions
?Thus far, we have argued that the competences?and capabilities (and hence competitive advantage)?of a firm rest fundamentally on processes, shaped?by positions and paths. However, competences?can provide competitive advantage and generate?rents only if they are based on a collection of? routines, skills, and complementary assets that are??difficult to imitate.?A particular set of routines?can lose their value if they support a competence?which no longer matters in the marketplace, or?if they can be readily replicated or emulated by?competitors. Imitation occurs when firms discover?and simply copy a firm’s organizational routines?and procedures. Emulation occurs when firms?discover alternative ways of achieving the same??functionality.
?Replication?
To understand imitation, one must first understand?replication. Replication involves transferring or?redeploying competences from one concrete economic setting to another. Since productive knowledge is embodied, this cannot be accomplished?by simply transmitting information. Only in those?instances where all relevant knowledge is fully?codified and understood can replication be collapsed into a simple problem of information transfer. Too often, the contextual dependence of original performance is poorly appreciated, so unless?firms have replicated their systems of productive?knowledge on many prior occasions, the act of?replication is likely to be difficult (Teece, 1976).?Indeed, replication and transfer are often impossible absent the transfer of people, though this?can be minimized if investments are made to?convert tacit knowledge to codified knowledge.?Often, however, this is simply not possible.
组织流程和岗位的可复制性和可模仿性
?到目前为止，我们认为，坚定的休息根本上过程的才能和能力（竞争优势），形状位置和路径。然而，能力可以提供有竞争力的优势，并产生租金只有当他们是难以模仿的套路，技能，互补性资产的基础上的集合。一组特定的例程可以失去其价值，如果他们支持的能力，在市场上不再是问题，或者如果他们可以很容易地复制或竞争对手所仿效。仿发生，当企业发现并简单地复制一个公司的组织惯例和程序。仿真时，当企业发现替代的方法实现相同的功能。
?复制
要理解模仿，首先必须了解复制。复制涉及到一个具体的经济环境到另一个转移或重新部署的能力。由于生产性知识体现，这无法通过简单地发送信息。只有在这些情况下，所有相关的知识是完全编纂和理解可以复制??倒塌的信息传递到一个简单的问题。常常，上下文依赖原有的性能不佳赞赏，因此，除非公司已经复制了他们的生产知识的系统在许多事先场合，复制的行为是相当困难的（蒂斯，1976）。事实上，往往是不可能复制和转让没有转让人，虽然这可以最小化，如果投资是隐性知识转换成编码知识。然而，通常情况下，这简直是不可能的。
?In short, competences and capabilities, and the?routines upon which they rest, are normally rather??difficult to replicate. Even understanding what?all the relevant routines are that support a particular competence may not be transparent. Indeed,?Lippman and Rumelt (1992) have argued that?some sources of competitive advantage are so?complex that the firm itself, let alone its competitors,?does not understand them. As Nelson and??Winter (1982) and Teece (1982) have explained,?many organizational routines are quite tacit in?nature. Imitation can also be hindered by the fact?few routines are ‘stand-alone;’ coherence may?require that a change in one set of routines in?one part of the firm (e.g., production) requires?changes in some other part (e.g., R&D).?
Some routines and competences seem to be?attributable to local or regional forces that shape?firms’ capabilities at early stages in their lives.?Porter (1990), for example, shows that differences?in local product markets, local factor markets,?and institutions play an important role in shaping?competitive capabilities. Differences also exist?within populations of firms from the same country. Various studies of the automobile industry,?for example, show that not all Japanese automobile companies are top performers in terms of?quality, productivity, or product development?(see, for example, Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).?The role of firm-specific history has been highlighted as a critical factor explaining such firm-level (as opposed to regional or national-level)?differences (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Replication in a different context may thus be rather?difficult.
总之,能力和功能,和例程,在其中他们休息,通常很难复制。即使了解所有相关的例程,支持一个特定的能力可能不是透明的。事实上,利普曼和鲁梅尔特(1992)认为,一些竞争优势的来源是如此复杂,该公司本身,更不用说它的竞争对手,不理解他们。正如纳尔逊和冬季(1982)和(1982)所解释的蒂斯,许多组织惯例很隐性的自然。模仿也可以阻碍了一些例程的事实是“的;“相干可能要求改变一组例程一个部分的公司(例
如。、生产)需要改变一些其他部分(如。、研发) 。
一些套路和能力似乎是由于当地或地区的力量，形状企业能力的早期阶段，在他们的生活中。波特（1990），例如，显示本地产品市场，本地生产要素市场和机构的差异塑造竞争能力发挥了重要作用。种群内来自同一国家的企业也存在分歧。 ，例如，汽车行业的各种研究表明，并不是所有的日本汽车公司在质量，生产力，产品开发方面都是顶级的表演者（例如，克拉克和藤本，1991）。这个角色特有的历史已经被列为关键因素解释这样的公司级(相对于区域或国家级)差异(纳尔逊和冬天,1982)。复制在不同的上下文可能因此是相当困难的。
?At least two types of strategic value flow?from replication. One is the ability to support?geographic and product line expansion. To the?extent that the capabilities in question are relevant to customer needs elsewhere, replication?can confer value.??Another is that the ability? to replicate also indicates that the firm has the?foundations in place for learning and improvement. Considerable empirical evidence supports?the notion that the understanding of processes,?both in production and in management, is the?key to process improvement. In short, an?organization cannot improve that which it does?not understand. Deep process understanding is?often required to accomplish codification.?Indeed, if knowledge is highly tacit, it indicates?that underlying structures are not well understood, which limits learning because scientific?and engineering principles cannot be as systematically applied.?Instead, learning is confined??to proceeding through trial and error, and the?leverage that might otherwise come from the?application of scientific theory is denied.?
至少有两种类型的战略价值流从复制。其一是支持地域和产品线扩张能力。其他地方的客户需求相关问题的能力在一定程度上，的复制可以赋予值。另一个原因是，复制的能力也表示，该公司在学习和改进的地方有根基。大量的经验证据支持这一概念的理解，无论是在生产和管理过程，是过程改进的关键。总之，一个组织不能提高它不明白。深部过程的认识往往需要完成编纂。的确，如果知识是高度默契的，它表明，底层结构没有很好的理解，这了学习，因为科学和工程的原则不能应用系统。相反，学习局限于继续通过试验和错误，被拒绝的杠杆，否则可能来自科学理论的应用。
Imitation?
Imitation is simply replication performed by a?competitor. If self-replication is difficult, imitation?is likely to be harder. In competitive markets,?it is the ease of imitation that determines the?sustainability of competitive advantage. Easy imitation implies the rapid dissipation of rents.?
Factors that make replication difficult also?make imitation difficult. Thus, the more tacit the?firm’s productive knowledge, the harder it is to?replicate by the firm itself or its competitors.?When the tacit component is high, imitation may?well be impossible, absent the hiring away of?key individuals and the transfers of key organization processes.
?However, another set of barriers impedes imitation of certain capabilities in advanced industrial?countries. This is the system of intellectual property rights, such as patents, trade secrets, and trademarks, and even trade dress.?Intellectual?property protection is of increasing importance in?the United States, as since 1982 the legal system?has adopted a more pro-patent posture. Similar?trends are evident outside the United States.?Besides the patent system, several other factors?cause there to be a difference between replication?costs and imitation costs. The observability of?the technology or the organization is one such?important factor. Whereas vistas into product?technology can be obtained through strategies?such as reverse engineering, this is not the case?for process technology, as a firm need not expose?its process technology to the outside in order to?benefit from it.?Firms with product technology,??on the other hand, confront the unfortunate circumstances that they must expose what they have?got in order to profit from the technology. Secrets?are thus more protectable if there is no need to?expose them in contexts where competitors can?learn about them.?
仿制品
模仿是根本的竞争对手进行复制。如果自我复制是困难的，模仿可能更难。在竞争激烈的市场中，
它是模仿的难易程度决定了竞争优势的可持续性。易模仿意味着租金快速消散。
难以复制的因素也使仿困难。因此，该公司的生产知识更默契，就越难是由该公司本身还是其竞争对手复制。当默契的成分是高仿可能是不可能的，不存在聘用相差的关键人物和关键组织流程的转让。
?然而，另一组壁垒阻碍模仿某些功能先进的工业国家。这是系统的知识产权，如专利，商业秘密，商标，甚至是外贸服饰。知识产权保护是在美国的重要性日益增加，自1982年以来的法律制度已经采取了更加有利于专利的姿势。美国以外的类似的趋势是显而易见的。除了专利制度，有其他一些因素导致复制成本和模仿成本之间的差异。技术或组织的观察，就是这样的一个重要因素。鉴于到产品技术的远景可以通过逆向工程等战略，这是不是工艺技术的情况下，作为一个企业需要不公开其工艺技术到外面，以从中受益。产品技术的企业，另一方面，面对不幸的情况下，他们必须公开他们有什么，以便从中牟利的技术。秘密因而更受保护的，如果没有他们暴露在竞争对手的上下文中可以了解他们的需要。
One should not, however, overestimate the?overall importance of intellectual property protection; yet it presents a formidable imitation barrier?in certain particular contexts. Intellectual property?protection is not uniform across products, processes, and technologies, and is best thought of as?islands in a sea of open competition. If one is?not able to place the fruits of one’s investment,?ingenuity, or creativity on one or more of the?islands, then one indeed is at sea.?
We use the term appropriability regimes to?describe the ease of imitation. Appropriability?is a function both of the ease of replication and?the efficacy of intellectual property rights as a?barrier to imitation. Appropriability is strong?when a technology is both inherently difficult?to replicate and the intellectual property system?provides legal barriers to imitation. When it?is inherently easy to replicate and intellectual?property protection is either unavailable or ineffectual, then appropriability is weak. Intermediate conditions also exist.?
然而，人们不应该高估的整体知识产权保护的重要性，然而在某些特定情况下，它提出了一个强大的模仿障碍。知识产权保护是不统一的产品，工艺和技术，最好的思想作为一个开放竞争的海洋岛屿。如果一个人是不是能够把一个或多个岛屿上的投资，独创性或创造性成果，那么确实是一个在海上。
我们使用长期独占制度模仿的难易程度来形容。独占是一个函数，易于复制和知识产权作为一个模仿障碍的疗效。专用性强，技术本质上是既难以复制和知识产权制度提供了法律上的障碍模仿。当它本质上是易于复制和知识产权保护不可用或无效，那么独占性较弱。中级条件也是存在的。
CONCLUSION?
The four paradigms discussed above are quite?different, though the first two have much in?common with each other (strategizing) as do the?last two (economizing). But are these paradigms?complementary or competitive? According to?some authors, ‘the resource perspective complements the industry analysis framework’ (Amit?and Schoemaker, 1993: 35). While this is?undoubtedly true, we think that in several?important respects the perspectives are also competitive. While this should be recognized, it is?not to suggest that there is only one framework?that has value. Indeed, complex problems are?likely to benefit from insights obtained from all?of the paradigms we have identified plus more.?The trick is to work out which frameworks are?appropriate for the problem at hand. Slavish?adherence to one class to the neglect of all?others is likely to generate strategic blindspots.?The tools themselves then generate strategic?vulnerability. We now explore these issues?further. Table 1 summarizes some similarities?and differences.?
结论
上面讨论的四个范式有很大的不同，虽然前两个有很多共同点与对方运筹帷幄，做最后的两个（节约型）。但这些范式互补或竞争？据一些作者认为，“资源的角度补充业内人士分析框架”（阿米特和苏梅克尔的，1993：35）。虽然这无疑是正确的，我们认为，在几个重要方面的观点也具有竞争力。虽然这应该被确认，它不是表明，有一个框架，该框架具有价值。事实上，复杂的问题，有可能受益于所有的范式，我们已经确定了加获得的见解。诀窍在于制定出适合手头上的问题的框架。奴性坚持一个类，
而忽视其他所有可能产生的战略盲点。工具本身产生的战略脆弱性。现在我们进一步探讨这些问题。表1总结了一些相似性和差异。
Efficiency vs. market power
?The competitive forces and strategic conflict?approaches generally see profits as stemming?from strategizing—that is, from limitations on?competition which firms achieve through raising?rivals’ costs and exclusionary behavior (Teece,?1984). The competitive forces approach in?particular leads one to see concentrated industries?as being attractive—market positions can be?shielded behind entry barriers, and rivals costs?can be raised. It also suggests that the sources?of competitive advantage lie at the level of the?industry, or possibly groups within an industry.?In text book presentations, there is almost no?attention at all devoted to discovering, creating,?and commercializing new sources of value.
?The dynamic capabilities and resources?approaches clearly have a different orientation.?They see competitive advantage stemming from?high-performance routines operating ‘inside the?firm,’ shaped by processes and positions. Path?dependencies (including increasing returns) and?technological opportunities mark the road ahead.?Because of imperfect factor markets, or more?precisely the non-tradability of ‘soft’ assets like?values, culture, and organizational experience,?distinctive competences and capabilities generally?cannot be acquired; they must be built. This?sometimes takes years—possibly decades. In?some cases, as when the competence is protected?by patents, replication by a competitor is ineffectual as a means to access the technology. The?capabilities approach accordingly sees definite?limits on strategic options, at least in the short?run. Competitive success occurs in part because?of policies pursued and experience and efficiency?obtained in earlier periods.
效率与市场力量
?竞争力和战略冲突接近，一般看到利润作为源于运筹帷幄，是，对竞争的，公司实现通过提高竞争对手的成本和排他性行为（蒂斯，1984）。尤其是导致竞争力的方法集中的行业是可以屏蔽的有吸引力的市场地位，进入壁垒的背后，可以提高对手成本。这也表明，竞争优势的来源在于行业的水平，或可能是行业内的群体。课本介绍，几乎没有注意，在所有致力于发现，创造和商业化，新的价值来源。
动态能力和资源的方法显然有不同的取向。他们认为竞争优势源于高性能程序操作的公司在内部,形成了流程和职位。路径依赖关系(包括增加利润)和技术机会马克前方的道路。由于不完善的要素市场,更准确地说是非可交易性的“软”等资产的价值、文化和组织经验,独特的竞争力,通常不能被收购,他们必须建立。这有时需要年可能几十年。在某些情况下,当能力是受到专利的保护,被竞争对手复制是无效作为一种手段来访问技术。相应的功能方法明确战略选择看到,至少在短期内。竞争成功发生在部分是因为追求和经验和效率获得在早期的时期。
?Competitive success can undoubtedly flow ?from both strategizing and economizing,?but?along with Williamson (1991) we believe that?‘economizing is more fundamental than strategizing . ... or put differently, that economy is the best strategy.’?Indeed, we suggest that, except??in special circumstances, too much ‘strategizing’?can lead firms to under-invest in core competences?and neglect dynamic capabilities, and thus harm?long-term competitiveness. 竞争的成功无疑能流的运筹帷幄和节约，但随着威廉姆森（1991），我们认为“节约是更基本的运筹帷幄。 ...或将不同，即经济是最好的策略。“事实上，我们建议，除非在特殊情况下，太多的”运筹帷幄“可能会导致企业投资不足的核心竞争力，而忽视动态能力，从而损害长期竞争力。
?Normative implications
?The field of strategic management is avowedly?normative. It seeks to guide those aspects of?general management that have material effects on?the survival and success of the business enterprise. Unless these various approaches differ in?terms of the framework and heuristics they offer?management, then the discourse
we have gone?through is of limited immediate value. In this?paper, we have already alluded to the fact that?the capabilities approach tends to steer managers?toward creating distinctive and difficult-to-imitate?advantages and avoiding games with customers?and competitors. We now survey possible differences, recognizing that the paradigms are still in?their infancy and cannot confidently support?strong normative conclusions.?
规范性的影响
?战略管理领域，是公然的规范性。旨在引导那些一般管理方面有重大影响，对企业的生存和成功的。除非这些不同的方法不同的框架和启发式他们提供管理方面，我们已经走过的话语是直接的价值有限。在本文中，我们已经提到的事实的能力方法往往，引导管理者向着创造独特的，难以模仿的优势，避免与客户和竞争对手的游戏。我们现在调查可能存在差异，认识的范式仍处于起步阶段，并不能理直气壮支持较强的规范性结论。
Unit of analysis and analytic focus
?Because in the capabilities and the resources?framework business opportunities flow from a?firm’s unique processes, strategy analysis must be situational.?This is also true with the strategic? conflict approach. There is no algorithm for?creating wealth for the entire industry. Prescriptions they apply to industries or groups of firms?at best suggest overall direction, and may indicate?errors to be avoided. In contrast, the competitive?forces approach is not particularly firm specific;?it is industry and group specific.
分析单位和分析的重点
?因为从一个企业的独特流程的能力和资源框架商机流，战略分析必须的态势。这也是真正的战略冲突的方法。有没有创造财富，为整个行业的算法。它们适用于行业或企业群体的最好建议处方总体方向，并可能表明要避免的错误。与此相反，没有特别的公司特定的竞争力的方法是，它是工业和组特定的。
?Strategic change?
The competitive forces and the strategic conflict?approach, since they pay little attention to skills,?know-how, and path dependency, tend to see?strategic choice occurring with relative facility.?The capabilities approach sees value augmenting?strategic change as being difficult and costly.?Moreover, it can generally only occur incrementally. Capabilities cannot easily be bought; they?must be built. From the capabilities perspective,?strategy involves choosing among and committing?to long-term paths or trajectories of competence?development.
?In this regard, we speculate that the dominance?of competitive forces and the strategic conflict?approaches in the United States may have something to do with observed differences in strategic?approaches adopted by some U.S. and some foreign firms. Hayes (1985) has noted that American?companies tend to favor ‘strategic leaps’ while,?in contrast, Japanese and German companies tend?to favor incremental, but rapid, improvements.?
战略转变
竞争力和战略冲突的方法，因为他们不注意技巧，诀窍和路径依赖，往往看到的战略选择相对设施发生。功能的方法是看值增加战略变化是困难和昂贵的。此外,它通常只出现增量。功能不能轻易购买,他们必须建立。从功能的角度来看,战略涉及选择在和致力于长期发展能力的路径或轨迹。
?在这方面，我们推测，可能有一些竞争力的主导地位和战略利益冲突的方法在美国观察到的差异，一些美国和一些外国公司通过战略方针做。海斯（1985）指出，美国公司往往青睐“战略跨越的同时，相比之下，日本和德国的公司倾向于增量，但迅速改善。
Entry strategies?
Here the resources and the capabilities approaches?suggest that entry decisions must be made with?reference to the competences and capabilities?which new entrants have, relative to the competition. Whereas the other approaches tell you little?about where to look to find likely entrants, the?capabilities approach identifies likely entrants.?Relatedly, whereas the entry deterrence approach?suggests an unconstrained
search for new business?opportunities, the capabilities approach suggests?that such opportunities lie close in to one’s existing business. As Richard Rumelt has explained?it in conversation, ‘the capabilities approach suggests that if a firm looks inside itself, and at its?market environment, sooner or later it will find?a business opportunity.’?
进入策略
这里的资源和能力的方法表明，进入决策必须参考新加入者，相对竞争的才能和能力。而其他方法知之甚少哪里去找找可能的参赛者，告诉你的能力的方法来识别可能进入。与此相关，而慑入的方法建议不受约束的寻找新的商业机会，表明，这样的机会在于接近现有业务的能力的方法。正如理查德罗曼尔特解释，在交谈中，“能力”的做法表明，如果一个企业内部本身看起来，在市场环境中，它迟早会找到一个商业机会。“
Entry timing?
Whereas the strategic conflict approach tells little?abut where to look to find likely entrants, the?resources and the capabilities approach identifies?likely entrants and their timing of entry. Brittain?and Freeman (1980) using population ecology?methodologies argued that an organization is?quick to expand when there is a significant overlap between its core capabilities and those needed?to survive in a new market. Recent research?(Mitchell, 19) showed that the more industry-specialized assets or capabilities a firm possesses,?the more likely it is to enter an emerging technical subfield in its industry, following a technological discontinuity. Additionally, the interaction?between specialized assets such as firm-specific?capabilities and rivalry had the greatest influence?on entry timing.?
进入时机
而战略冲突的方法告诉小邻接到哪里去找,找到可能的进入者、资源和能力的方法识别可能的参与者,他们的时间的条目。布和弗里曼(1980)使用种群生态学方法认为,一个组织是快速扩大当有明显的重叠其核心能力和那些需要生存在一个新的市场。最近的研究(米切尔,19)表明,更多的行业专用资产或功能一个公司拥有,越有可能进入一个新兴技术领域的行业后,技术不连续性。此外,专业之间的交互等资产公司特有的功能和竞争影响最大的人在进入计时。
Diversification?
Related diversification that is, diversification that?builds upon or extends existing capabilities—is?about the only form of diversification that a?resources/capabilities framework is likely to view?as meritorious (Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1980, 1982;?Teece et al., 1994). Such diversification will be?justifiable when the firms’ traditional markets?decline.?The strategic conflict approach is likely to be a little more permissive; acquisitions that?raise rivals’ costs or enable firms to effectuate?exclusive arrangements are likely to be seen as?efficacious in certain circumstances.?
多样化
相关多元化，多样化，建立或扩展现有能力的唯一形式多样化，资源/能力框架可能观看立功（1974年罗曼尔特，蒂斯，1980年，1982年;蒂斯等。 ，1994）。这种多样化将是合理的，当公司的传统市场下降。战略冲突的做法很可能是一个小更宽松的收购，提高竞争对手的成本，使企业招致独家安排有可能在某些情况下被视为有效。
Focus and specialization?
Focus needs to be defined in terms of distinctive?competences or capability, not products. Products?are the manifestation of competences, as competences can be molded into a variety of products.?Product market specialization and decentralization?configured around product markets may cause?firms to neglect the development of core competences and dynamic capabilities, to the extent?to which competences require accessing assets?across divisions.
?The capabilities approach places emphasis on?the internal processes that a firm utilizes, as well?as how
they are deployed and how they will?evolve. The approach has the benefit of indicating?that competitive advantage is not just a function?of how one plays the game; it is also a function?of the ‘assets’ one has to play with, and how?these assets can be deployed and redeployed in?a changing market.?
聚焦和专业化
需要关注的方面定义独特的能力或能力,而不是产品。产品的表现能力,能力可以被塑造成各种各样的产品。产品市场专门化和分散配置在产品市场可能会导致公司忽视发展核心能力和动态能力,能力的程度需要跨部门访问资产。
?功能接近的地方强调，公司利用内部流程，以及它们是如何部署的，以及他们将如何演变。表明竞争优势的好处不只是一个功能如何玩游戏的方法，它也是一个功能的“资产”有一起玩，并在不断变化的，这些资产如何被部署和重新部署市场。
Future directions
?We have merely sketched an outline for a?dynamic capabilities approach. Further theoretical?work is needed to tighten the framework, and?empirical research is critical to helping us understand how firms get to be good, how they sometimes stay that way, why and how they improve,?63?and why they sometimes decline. Researchers?in the field of strategy need to join forces with?researchers in the fields of innovation, manufacturing, and organizational behavior and business?history if they are to unlock the riddles that lie?behind corporate as well as national competitive?advantage. There could hardly be a more?ambitious research agenda in the social sciences?today.
未来的发展方向
?我们只是勾画一个轮廓一个动态的能力的方法。进一步的理论工作是需要收紧的框架和实证研究是至关重要的，以帮助我们了解企业如何获得好，他们有时会保持这种方式，为什么他们是如何提高，63和为什么他们有时会下降。研究人员在该领域的战略需要与创新，制造，组织行为学和创业史领域的研究人员联手，如果他们要解开谜语背后企业以及国家的竞争优势。很难有一个更加雄心勃勃的今天，在社会科学的研究议程。
?ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS?
Research for this paper was aided by support?from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation through the?Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation?at the University of California, Berkeley. The?authors are grateful for helpful comments from?two anonymous referees, as well as from Raffi?Amit, Jay Barney, Joseph Bower, Henry Chesbrough, Giovanni Dosi, Sumantra Goshal, Pankaj?Ghemawat, Connie Helfat, Rebecca Henderson,?Dan Levinthal, Richard Nelson, Margie Peteraf,?Richard Rosenbloom, Richard Rumelt, Carl?Shapiro, Oliver Williamson, and Sidney Winter.?Useful feedback was obtained from workshops at?the Haas School of Business, the Wharton School,?the Kellogg School (Northwestern), the Harvard?Business School, and the International Institute?of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna,?the London School of Economics, and the London?Business School.??
致谢
本文的研究得益于由斯隆基金会通过在伯克利加州大学的竞争与合作财团支持。作者感谢两位匿名审稿人，以及来自拉斐尔·阿密特（Raffi Amit），杰伊·巴尼，约瑟夫·鲍尔，亨利·切斯布罗格，乔瓦尼·多西，苏曼德拉Goshal的Pankaj格玛沃特，康妮Helfat，丽贝卡·亨德森，丹·列文托，理查德·尼尔森，玛吉有益的意见Peteraf，理查德·罗森布鲁姆，理查德罗曼尔特，卡尔·夏皮罗，奥利弗·威廉姆森，西德尼·冬季。获得有用的反馈，从车间的哈斯商学院，沃顿商学院，凯洛格商学院（西北），哈佛商学院，和国际应用系统分析研究所（IIASA）在维也纳，伦敦经济学院，并伦敦商学院。
因篇幅问题不能全部显示，请点此查看更多更全内容
Copyright © 2019- huatuo9.cn 版权所有 赣ICP备2023008801号-1
违法及侵权请联系：TEL:199 18 7713 E-MAIL:2724546146@qq.com
本站由北京市万商天勤律师事务所王兴未律师提供法律服务